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CORPORATE CULTURE AND COMPETITION COMPLIANCE
IN EAST ASIA
Jingyuan Ma *
Mel Marquis **
Abstract
Efforts to secure competition law compliance among
commercial operators can usefully be tailored in a way
that takes account of cultural characteristics. Since
culture forms part of the conditions in which the
development of a robust and credible compliance system
occurs, it makes sense to approach compliance issues in
a manner sensitive to that cultural background. In the
context of East Asian enterprises, this implies a need to
take account of the legacy of Confucian ethics, which has
had a profound influence on the psychology and
behavior of commercial organizations in the region. The
importance of that legacy suggests that compliance will
not be achieved within East Asian firms solely on the
basis of the external legal environment, an environment
in which deterrence-oriented factors such as sanctions
and the threat of detection play a central role. More
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attention should be given to the internal moral and social
environment, and to shaping the logic of
appropriateness within a given firm. A compliance
culture can thus be constructed on the basis of elements
such as moral commitment, Eastern-style education, the
cultivation of virtue, and the convergence of the interests
of the enterprise and those of its employees.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, antitrust authorities have taken
actions to encourage companies to implement
compliance programs, thereby raising the likelihood that
they conform to the requirements of antitrust law. Such
actions include offering reductions in fines, 1 issuing
compliance guides, 2 and producing YouTube videos, or

See, e.g., Guidance as to the Appropriate Amount of Penalty, OFF. OF
FAIR
TRADING
(2012),
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284393/oft423.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Drivers of Compliance and Non-Compliance with
Competition Law: An Oft Report, OFF. OF FAIR TRADING (2010),
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284405/oft1227.pdf; How your Business can Achieve Compliance with
OF
FAIR
TRADING
(2011),
Competition
Law,
OFF.
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/284402/oft1341.pdf; Promoting Compliance with Competition, ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2012) [hereinafter OECD],
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetiti
onlaw2011.pdf. See also United States Sentencing Commission, 2015 US
1
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even cartoons, to aid compliance training. 3 In the United
States, if an offending firm has implemented a
compliance program, it may be taken into account when
the authorities decide whether the enterprise will be
prosecuted, whether it should be rewarded with a fine
reduction, and during any settlement negotiations. 4 In
Australia, Canada, France, India, Israel, Italy, Singapore,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom, the effectiveness
of existing compliance programs will be considered by
the competition authority when calculating fines or in the
context of settlements.5 Among those authorities, some

SENTENCING
COMMISSION
GUIDELINES
MANUAL
(2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2015-guidelines-manual.
3 See Benefits of Competition Policy for Consumers, Eur. Comm’n on
Competition
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html
(April 16, 2012); Ted Banks & Joe Murphy, The International Law of
Antitrust Compliance, 40 DENVER J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y 368, 373-4 (2012);
see NMaMovie, Leniency in Cartel Cases, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2008),
see
also
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5diFAaJdweI;
Konkurrensverket, Be the First to Tell - A Film about Leniency, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 3, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_r99qzC8aHA.
4 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 376 (citing United States
Att’ys’ Manual, STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE 9-28.000, (2018)
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcr
m.htm#9-28.800).
5 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 379-80. Subject to variations
and nuances, certain jurisdictions including Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
UK and the US provide for the possibility of fine reductions for companies
with effective compliance programs. Other authorities, including notably
the European Commission and most European competition agencies (with
some exceptions) maintain the opposite policy and refrain from granting
fine reductions. See, e.g., Eva Lachnit, Compliance Programmes in
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(such as those in the United States, 6 Canada, 7 The
Netherlands, 8 and France 9 ) provide guidelines on the
key elements and tools that should be incorporated in a
compliance program, whereas others, such as the
competition authority in Singapore, 10 provide standards
that will be used to evaluate whether, in the authority’s
view, the compliance program is effective. 11
The latter point concerning Singapore illustrates the
fundamental point that adopting a compliance program
is not sufficient; the crucial issue is whether a well-

Competition Law: Improving the Approach of Competition Authorities, 10
UTRECHT L. REV. 31, 46 (2014).
6 See US Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 2.
7 See Corporate Compliance Programs, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU
(Jan.
3,
2015),
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cbbc.nsf/eng/03927.html.
8 See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 38.
9 The French competition authority (the Autorité de la concurrence)
has issued compliance guide brochures in English and French (Antitrust
compliance and Compliance Programmes - Corporate Tools for Competing
Safely
in
the
Marketplace)http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/brochure_confor
mite_uk.pdf (2018); see also, Framework Document on Antitrust
Compliance Programmes, AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE (2012),
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/framework_document_complia
nce_10february2012.pdf.
10 See Guidelines on the Appropriate Amount of Penalty, COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE, https://www.cccs.gov.sg/legislation/cccsguidelines (last updated Jan. 24, 2019).
11 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 382.
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designed compliance program is effectively and
sustainably implemented. 12 The current debate on
corporate compliance is largely based on optimal
deterrence theory—it revolves around the use of
“carrots” (fine reductions) and “sticks” (criminal
penalties) to induce compliance. 13 However, the
deterrence model has some shortcomings. 14 In the

The need to consider not just the existence of a compliance program
but also its effectiveness is stated succinctly by Transparency InternationalUSA in the anti-corruption context: “Verification reviews should focus on
two questions: is the program well-designed and is the program operating
effectively?” Verification of Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs,
INT’L-USA
(2014),
TRANSPARENCY
https://www.coalitionforintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/TIUSA_2014_verificationreportfinal.pdf.
13 See generally Anne Riley & Daniel Sokol, Rethinking Compliance,
3 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 31 (2015).
14 See Kevin Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence
Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 7-11 (1983) (highlighting objections to
deterrence theory that are based on, inter alia: the occasionally unrealistic
nature of the rational actor model; a lack of convincing proof of causation
between sanctions and deterrence; deterrence theory’s indifference to
morality; paradoxes such as the fact that the specific deterrent effect of
sanctions has already failed if the sanction must be administered once an
offense has been committed; certain classic critiques of utilitarianism, for
example that it instrumentalizes human beings or is, even worse, “sadistic”
in nature; and the possibility that the “ambiguity that often pervades the
punishment message can diminish the deterrent effect”). See also KAREN
YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH 63-72 (2004) (on
the issue of the deterrence theory’s assumption that firms carefully weigh
the costs and benefits of illegal conduct and thus respond rationally to
prescribed punishments, Yeung notes that “empirical studies suggest that
corporations are not solely driven by self-seeking individuals concerned
12
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context of compliance programs, no clear empirical
evidence demonstrates a causal link between the threat
of sanctions and effective compliance, and surveys show
that business practitioners are often unaware of
compliance requirements in relation to antitrust law. 15
Research also shows that severe sanctions alone are
unlikely to achieve deterrence and optimal compliance.
An effective motivation to comply with the law is better
secured by increasing the perceived value of such
compliance and increasing the perceived risk that
misconduct will be detected. 16

exclusively with the pursuit of profit, but who may be motivated, at least
partially, by non-financial concerns, including a sense of social
responsibility and respect for the rule of law. If so, then attempting to deter
commercial firms from committing offences on pain of punishment may be
only weakly effective, and perhaps less effective, than the use of nonpunitive strategies to encourage compliance.”).
15 See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What
Practitioners Really Think about Compliance, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 201
(2012).
16 See Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, The ACCC
Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings,
ANU CENT. FOR COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POL’Y (December 1, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=906945 (summarizing national survey of business
practitioners in Australia regarding their attitudes, beliefs and experiences
on compliance with respect to competition and consumer protection law and
with respect to the enforcement activities of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission); Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker,
Mixed Motives: Economic, Social and Normative Motivations in Business
Compliance, 34 L. & POL’Y 428 (2012). See also Christine Parker, The
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Despite such problems with deterrence-based
strategies to promote compliance, some competition
agencies decline to explore the possibility of putting
more attention on rewarding enterprises that show a bona
fide commitment to compliance. 17 The use of carrots
(notably in the form of fine reductions) to incentivize
companies to design and implement competition
programs 18 has been criticized. 19

“Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory
Enforcement, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 591 (2006) (recommending responsive
regulation as a means of “leveraging” deterrence). See generally Christine
Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Deterrence and the Impact of
Calculative Thinking on Business Compliance with Regulation, 56
ANTITRUST BULL. 377 (2011).
17 The European Commission explains its policy in the following
terms.: “If a company which has put a compliance programme in place is
nevertheless found to have committed an infringement of EU competition
rules, the question of whether there is any positive impact on the level of
fines frequently arises. The answer is: No. Compliance programmes should
not be perceived by companies as an abstract and formalistic tool for
supporting the argument that any fine to be imposed should be reduced if
the company is ‘caught.’ The purpose of a compliance programme should
be to avoid an infringement in the first place.” Compliance Matters: What
Companies Can Do Better to Respect EU Competition Rules 21, EUR.
COMMISSION (2012), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/78f46c48-e03e-4c36-bbbe-aa08c2514d7a/language-en.
18 See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust
Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 127, 146-47
(1997).
19 See Andreas Stephan, Why the UK’s New Approach to Competition
Compliance Makes for Good Enforcement, 1 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE
(2012); Wouters Wils, Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal
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As the debate on the desirability of rewarding
compliance programs proceeds, there is not a clear
consensus on how to determine whether a compliance
program is effective, and there is no universal template
for the content of such a program. It is true that efforts
have been made to create and expand a set of ingredients
for an effective compliance program. 20 On the other
hand, many have pointed out that compliance programs
are not “one size fits all,” although overall objectives and

Antitrust Enforcement, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 52 (2012); Damien Geradin,
Antitrust Compliance Programmes and Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A
Reply to Wouter Wils, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 325 (2013); Andreas Stephan,
Hear no Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes May Be
Ineffective at Preventing Cartels, CCP WORKING PAPER 09-09
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/1.122147!ccp09
-9wp.pdf; D. Daniel Sokol & Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Antitrust Corporate
Governance and Compliance, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L
ANTITRUST ECON. VOL. 2 586 (2014).
20 For example, Joe Murphy and William Kolasky have listed twenty
features on an ‘effective’ compliance program. See Joe Murphy & William
Kolasky, The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing
Cartel Behavior, 26 ANTITRUST 61 (2012). See also Christine Parker &
Sharon Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems:
Structure, Culture and Agency, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUS. RESPONSES
TO REG. (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011);
Christine Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and
Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETH. 201
(2009); Gary Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control
Systems: Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors,
42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41, 42 (1999).
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principal features may be identified. 21 Indeed, the same
type of compliance program may function differently in
firms with different organizational cultures. 22 Similar to
other competition enforcement instruments—such as
criminal sanctions, severe fines, 23 leniency programs,24

See, e.g., Joe Murphy, One Size Fits All: A Flawed Approach to
Company
Compliance
Programs
(2012),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/CartelCol
umnApril-2.pdf; OECD, supra note 2, at 13 (2012) (“Delegates and private
sector representatives agreed that ‘one size fits all’ approaches to designing
compliance programmes are not advisable because each sector and firm is
so different. However, clarifying the overall objectives and principal
features of good competition programmes can be helpful. There is general
agreement that these objectives can be summarized as ‘the 5 C’s’: (i)
Commitment, (ii) Culture, (iii) Compliance know-how and organization,
(iv) Controls and (v) Constant monitoring and improvement. Genuine
compliance programmes are taken seriously at every level of the
corporation, and they involve regular training, audits, screening and
updates.”).
22 This argument is likely reinforced by the consideration that, like the
proverbial “black box,” the internal workings and cultures of different firms
may be impervious to observation. See Ronald J. Mann & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Foreword, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 317, 323 (1996). See also Daron
Acemoglu & Simon H. Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON.
949 (2005) (explaining the importance of policy and the protections it
allows).
23 See, e.g., Sanghyun Lee, Using Action in Damages to Improve
Criminal Penalties Against Cartels: Comparative Analysis of Competition
Law of United States and South Korea, 16 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L. J. 55
(2007).
24 See ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE:
LENIENCY RELIGION 149 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Christopher Tran eds.,
2015) [hereinafter LENIENCY RELIGION].
21
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and individual liabilities—it is thought that compliance
programs should be implemented all around the world, 25
and yet, at the same time, there are doubts about whether
the same enforcement tool can be transplanted with
success in a vast number of countries with starkly
different backgrounds and cultures. 26
This article proposes that corporate culture has a
significant impact on the effectiveness of compliance,
since corporate culture contributes to the shaping of
incentives and constraints in a firm and thereby drives
behavior.
Competition law compliance and the
promotion of compliance by stakeholders external to the
firm should be cognizant of, and where appropriate
should be tailored to take account of, the corporate
cultures found in a given country or relevant geographic
space. It is argued that the effectiveness of compliance
mechanisms will largely depend on the extent to which
such mechanisms are embedded within the culture of
local businesses and local communities, 27 and

See John M. Connor, Global Antitrust Prosecutions of International
Cartels:
Focus
on
Asia
(2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027949.
26 See Anzhela Korzhevskaya, Achieving a Competition Compliance
Culture in Russia: Assessing the UK Experience in Compliance
Programmes to Deter Cartels, 3 RUSS. L. J. 62 (2015).
27 See, e.g., Theodore Banks, Antitrust Compliance—It’s All About the
ANTITRUST
CHRON.
1
(2012)
Culture,
CPI
http://www.canadianadvertisinglaw.com/antitrust-compliance-its-all25
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compatible with relevant social norms. 28 Where
sensitivity to these features is lacking, a competition
authority may be incapable of distinguishing between
cosmetic and genuine compliance. 29 As the work of
other commentators reveals, the objective should be to
trigger a deep transformation of internal corporate
culture and business ethics, as this may be the only sure
way to secure robust compliance with the law. 30

about-the-culture/. A more general debate on this issue relates to the cultural
barriers that condition the prospects of success for legal transplants. This
debate, particularly prominent since the 1970s, originates from
Montesquieu’s work The Spirit of Laws (Livre I) (Gallimard 1749)
(reprinted: J.P. Mayer & A.P. Kerr eds., 1970). Whereas legal
commentators (characterized as “legal scientists”) such as Judge
Easterbrook, propose sets of assumptions and criteria that purport to be
capable of application anywhere irrespective of cultural-historical
distinctions, “legal culturalists” such as Legrand and Hall argue that law is
unique, locally based, and “untranslatable.”
See Pierre Legrand,
Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 MODERN L. REV.
262 (1995); Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, 2 MEDIA
CULTURE & SOC’Y 57 (1980).
28 Law and anthropology scholars often claim that law is a form of
local “knowledge.” See Janet Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the
Rectification of Names in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 19, 28
(1996). As argued by Clifford Geertz, “local” refers not only to place, time,
class and variety of issue but also to “accent,” which is closely linked to
particularized local norms. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167-234 (3rd ed, 2000).
29 See generally Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance,
50 B. C. L. Rev. 1 (2009); Wils, supra note 19.
30 See LENIENCY RELIGION, supra note 24, at 301.
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This article proposes that the discourse on
compliance efforts and their effectiveness would be well
served by explicitly considering the relevance of
corporate culture, which may have distinct local
characteristics. In this context, local culture can be
relevant in two ways. First, there is a clear need to
incentivize companies to establish an internal
compliance program to prevent, or at least quickly
detect, illegal conduct (e.g. price fixing, market sharing,
bid-rigging and the like). Further, a firm’s incentives to
invest in compliance efforts are more likely to be
successful if enforcement policies go far beyond the
precarious assumption that “optimal deterrence” will
produce optimal compliance. The second consideration,
which concerns the wider public (including small
businesses) is that enforcement by a competition agency,
as well as judicial enforcement and the contributions of
civil society, should all aim to demonstrate the harmful
effects of cartels and establish a social norm that morally
condemns them. 31
These arguments are raised with the example of East
Asian firms, which have been influenced by Confucian

We are not alone in calling for broader public awareness and
stigmatization of cartels. See, e.g., Andreas Stephan, Cartel Laws
Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business
Cultures, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 345, 350 (2010).
31
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beliefs and by particular corporate organizational
cultures. The underlying contention is that if business
success in East Asia has been culture-driven, 32 then a
successful approach to competition law compliance
should likewise be culture-driven. This article begins
with the observation that in East Asia parts of Confucian
philosophy have substantially shaped cultural and
societal norms for thousands of years. 33 Confucianism
provided the fundamental basis for ancient jurisprudence

32 For the argument that the post-WWII economic success of East Asia
is culture-driven, see Michael Bond & Geert Hofstede, The Cash Value of
Confucian Values, CAPITALISM IN CONTRASTING CULTURES 383-90 (S.R.
Clegg & S.G. Redding eds., 1990). A few studies have attributed the
economic success of East Asian countries to Confucian business ethics.
See, e.g., Gary Kok Yew Chan, The Relevance and Value of Confucianism
in Contemporary Business Ethics, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 347 (2008); Edward
Romar, Globalization, Ethics, and Opportunism: A Confucian View of
Business Relationships, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q. 663 (2004); Kit-Chun Joanna
Lam, Confucian Business Ethics and the Economy, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 153
(2003); Daryl Koehn, Confucian Trustworthiness and the Practice of
Business in China, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 415 (2001).
33 See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Culture Matters: Cultural Differences
in the Reporting of Employment Discrimination Claims, 20 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS J. 405, 437 (2011). “No other philosophy has so deeply influenced
the life and thought of the East Asian people and character. Though many
profess to be Taoist, Buddhist, or Christian, they also simultaneously
profess to be Confucianist, as Confucianism has become an inseparable part
of East Asian thought and society, and synonymous with what it means to
be East Asian.” In particular contexts this expansive statement may need to
be tempered, as some societies exhibit some but not all of the classical
Confucian characteristics, and other influences have certainly also left their
own imprints.
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and imperial governance in East Asia, 34 and it became
the source of a “common Asian Law.” 35 Ancient
Confucian laws and philosophical norms in East Asia
have deeply influenced the organization of social
activities, the collective (un)conscious, and the behavior
of individuals in a wide variety of contexts. 36 This
distinctive cultural heritage and value system may
impede the re-modeling of corporate governance
according to assumptions and criteria of western, rulebased regimes. 37 Although there is a focus on
competition law as a specific sphere of business
regulation, the discussion in this article illustrates more
generally that compliance programs should be tailored to
take account of and if possible, harness the paradigms of
societal and business culture.

See CHONGKO CHOI, EAST ASIAN JURISPRUDENCE (2009).
Takao Tanase, Global Markets and the Evolution of Law in China
and Japan, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 873, 877 (2006).
36 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 33.
37 See Kun Luen Alex Lau & Angus Young, Why China Shall not
Completely Transit from a Relation Based to a Rule Based Governance
Regime: A Chinese Perspective, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE.: AN INT’L REV.
577 (2013) (explaining that relation-based governance was influenced by
Confucian doctrines and moral codes regulating behavior and relationships
and that, since relation-based governance is culturally embedded, firms in
China are unlikely to abandon it entirely in favor of a rule‐based system
imported from the West.).
34
35

2019

CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE

15

A caveat is required because there are many
variations in business and management cultures in
Asia. 38 This article acknowledges past criticism of
attempts to link pre-modern beliefs with modern
business organizations, and the risk of over-reliance on
culture-based—plus for that matter institution-based—
explanations. 39 Cognizant of the criticisms relating to
the linear model of organizational culture and business
performance, 40 and of the pitfalls of overestimating

38 See Managing Across Diverse Cultures in East Asia: Issues and
Challenges in a Changing Globalized World (Malcolm Warner ed., 2013);
Michael Minkov & Vesselin Blagoev, Is There a Distinct Asian
Management Culture?, 20 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 209 (2014).
39 See Barry Wilkinson, Culture, Institutions and Business in East
Asia, 17 ORG. STUD. 421 (1996) (critical of both culturist and institutionalist
perspectives, since each may lead to a determinist account that ignores
human agency and neglects the issues of interests, power and ideology in
business structures); Contra Sid Lowe, Culture and Network Institutions in
Hong Kong: A Hierarchy of Perspectives. A Response to Wilkinson:
‘Culture, Institutions and Business in East Asia, 19 ORG. STUD. 321 (1998)
(criticizing Wilkinson’s article and emphasizing, inter alia, the importance
of social, political, economic and other influences that provide context for
corporate behavior).
40 For criticisms on the overly simple nature of the studies on corporate
culture and organizational performance, see DANIEL R. DENISON,
CORPORATE CULTURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1990); JOHN
P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE
(1992); Daniel Carroll, A Disappointing Search for Excellence, 6 HARV.
BUS. REV. 78 (1982); George Gordon & Nancy Ditomaso, Predicting
Corporate Performance from Organizational Culture, 29 J. MGMT. STUD.
83 (1992); Paul Reynolds, Organizational Culture as Related to Industry,
Position and Performance: A Preliminary Report, 23 J. MGMT. STUD. 333
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cultural factors to explain managerial issues in ethnic
Chinese business, 41 this article nevertheless argues that
corporate culture, which is a reflection of societal
culture, partly determines the character and functioning
of an organization and that, consequently, corporate
culture may be an important factor in the development
and operation of internal compliance systems. This
article therefore identifies certain elements of East Asian
corporate culture and considers how they might be
further integrated into the design of compliance
programs in order to enhance the effectiveness of
competition laws to the benefit of societies that rely on
market institutions.
The analysis is structured as follows. Part two
argues that approaches to competition law compliance

(1986); Guy Saffold III, Culture Traits, Strength and Organizational
Performance: Moving Beyond “Strong” Culture, 113 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
546 (1988).
41 See Yuan Lu et al. Knowledge Management and Innovation Strategy
in the Asia Pacific: Toward an institution-based view, 25 ASIA PAC. J.
MGMT. 361, 374 (2008) discussing the theme of “Managing in Ethnic
Chinese Communities.” For an overview of the contributions to the Special
Issue, see David Ahlstrom et al., Managing in Ethnic Chinese Communities:
Culture, Institutions, and Context, 27 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 341, 344-9
(2010). Traditionally, many economists tended to be very negative towards
the explanatory power of culture. As Amir N. Licht once vividly noted:
“culture used to have a bad name among economists. It was not particularly
popular among lawyers [either]. One reason probably was that culture is
very difficult to observe. One therefore may fear that people would resort
to cultural explanations when they run out of good ones, as the former
would be impossible to disprove ….” Amir Licht (2014), Culture and Law
in Corporate Governance, ECGI L. Working Paper No. 247/2014, 15
(2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405538 (last visited July 30, 2018).
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should be culture-driven in the sense that culture should
be considered and if possible, harnessed to enhance the
quality and effectiveness of compliance. Part three
begins by summarizing Confucian values and the impact
of Confucianism on the general business environment.
Specifically, this article discusses the influence of
Confucian values by reference to three dimensions:
hierarchy-based leadership, the role of family in
business, and the interaction between internal and
external actors. Part four discusses the theoretical and
empirical literature on organizational culture, examines
management studies and corporate governance, and
identifies the organizational culture of East Asian
companies according to different ownership types (i.e.
state-owned companies, family businesses, and foreigninvested companies). Empirical literature from business
and management studies on corporate and organizational
culture in China, Japan, and Korea will be discussed in
order to highlight the characteristics of companies in
each country.
This connection considers how
competition law compliance could be facilitated by
taking account of Confucian values and patterns of
organizational culture. Part five focuses on competition
law compliance and reflects on how it may be possible
to harness cultural norms to enhance compliance efforts
in this context.
II. CORPORATE CULTURE AND COMPETITION

COMPLIANCE

A. CORPORATE CULTURE AS AN INTERNAL CONTROL

FORCE

Almost every organization has common values to
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maintain as a united entity. 42 Likewise, every business
entity embodies certain values and corporate culture. 43
As with the concept of culture itself, defining “corporate
culture” or the similar notion of “organizational culture”
presents difficulties. 44 According to Edgar Schein,
organizational culture is: “a pattern of shared basic
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and
therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way
to perceive, think and feel in relation to those
problems.” 45 Jay B. Barney defines organizational
culture as “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions,
and symbols that define the way in which a firm conducts
its business.” 46 Similarly, Rohit Deshpande and

42 See Jennifer Chatman & Karen Jehn, Assessing the Relationship
Between Industry Characteristics and Organizational Culture: How
Different Can You Be?, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 522, 525 (1994); John Van
Maanen & Stephen R. Barley, Toward a Theory of Organizational
Socialization, 6 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 287 (1984).
43 See Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological
Interpretation (1957).
44 For example, A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn claimed already
in the 1950s that 164 different meanings of “culture” had been identified in
anthropology and sociology. See A.L. Kroeber & Clyde Kluckhohn,
Culture: A Critical Review of the Concepts and Definitions (1952).
45 EDGAR SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 11, 12
(2nd ed. 1992).
46 Jay B. Barney, Organizational Culture: Can It Be a Source of
Sustained Competitive Advantage?, 11 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 656, 657 (1986).
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Frederick Webster describe organizational culture as
“patterns of shared values and beliefs that help
individuals understand organizational functioning and
thus provide them with norms for behaviors in the
organization.” 47 As Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy
point out, corporate culture is the “commercialized”
version of organizational culture. 48 The definition of
corporate culture provided by Jerald Greenberg and
Robert Baron suggests that, similar to the concept of
“culture” itself, corporate culture refers to the behavioral
norms, values, and expectations within an
organization. 49 Literature reviews provided by other
authors shared the view that corporate culture consists of
behavioral norms and “codes of conduct,” expressed in
varying combinations of formal and informal terms, and
that such norms and codes are generally understood and
accepted by the members of the organization. 50

Rohit Deshpande & Frederick E. Webster, Jr., Organizational
Culture and Marketing: Defining the Research Agenda, 53 J. Marketing 3,
4 (1989).
48 See Terrence E. Deal & Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate Cultures: The
Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life (1982).
49 See Jerald Greenberg & Robert A. Baron, Behavior in Organizations
544 (9th ed, 2008).
50 See, e.g., Golnaz Sadri & Brian Lees, Developing Corporate Culture
as a Competitive Advantage, 20 J. Mgmt. Dev. 853 (2001); Choong Y. Lee
& Jennifer Y. Lee, South Korean Corporate Culture and Its Lessons for
Building Corporate Culture in China, 9 J. Int’l. Mgmt. Stud. 33, 34 (2014).
47
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Business and management literature distinguish
between strong and weak corporate culture. 51 Strong
cultures are a source of competitive advantage, 52
organizational effectiveness, 53 innovation, 54 and better
financial performance. 55 It has also been argued that
corporate culture can be an instrument of “social
control” 56 and can complement other control systems to
Empirical
change incentives and preferences. 57

See Barney, supra note 46.
See id.; Denison, supra note 40; Kotter & Heskett, supra note 40;
Charles O’Reilly, Corporations, Culture, and Commitment: Motivation and
Social Control in Organizations, 31 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 9 (1989); Alan
Wilkins & William Ouchi, Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship
Between Culture and Organizational Performance, 28 Admin. Sci. Q. 468
(1983); Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy (1985).
53 See Daniel R. Denison & Aneil K. Mishra, Organizational Culture
and Organizational Effectiveness: A Theory and Some Preliminary
Empirical Evidence, 6 ORG. SCI. 204-223 (1995); Denison, supra note 40.
54 See Charlan Jeanne Nemeth & Barry M. Staw, The Tradeoffs of
Social Control and Innovation in Groups and Organizations, 22 Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology 175 (Leonard Berkowitz, ed., 1989).
55 See THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF
EXCELLENCE (1982); NOEL M. TICHY, MANAGING STRATEGIC CHANGE:
TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (1983); Shinichi Hirota
et al., Does Corporate Culture Matter? Evidence from Japan, WIAS
Discussion
Paper
No.2008-001
(2008),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/46881754.pdf.
56 See Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social
Control: Corporations, Cults, and Commitment, 18 RES. ORG. BEHAVIOR
(Barry Staw & Larry Cummings, eds., 1996).
57 See Luigi Guiso et al., Social Capital as Good Culture, 6 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N. 295 (2008); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Corporate Culture and
51
52
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literature shows that corporate culture has a direct
influence on corporate performance. 58 For example, the
empirical study by Shinichi Hirota demonstrates that
companies with strong culture managed to survive
during the business fluctuations, recession, and banking
crisis of 1997. 59 Economic literature portrays culture as
a substitute for contracts in that it can solve coordination
problems within sizable firms. 60 As Barney explained,
organizational culture not only has “pervasive effects”
that are sustainably applied to customers, suppliers, and
competitors, it also affects how these actors engage with
each other. 61 The literature reviewed above thus

the Nature of the Firm, TRANSACTION COST ECON. & BEYOND 249 (Jo
Groenewegen ed., 1996).
58 See, e.g., Rohit Deshpandé et al., Corporate Culture, Customer
Orientation, and Innovativeness in Japanese Firms: A Quadrad Analysis.
57 J. Marketing 23 (1993); Daniel R. Denison & Aneil K. Mishra, Toward
a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness, 6 Org. Sci. 203, 20304 (1995); Jin Han et al., Market Orientation and Organizational
Performance: Is Innovation a Missing Link?, 62 J. MARKETING 30 (1998).
59 See Hirota et al., supra note 55.
60 See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,
PERSP. ON POSITIVE POL. ECON. 90 (James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds.,
1990). According to Robert Cooter and Melvin Eisenberg, the cultural norm
of fairness was a “stable platform” serving to induce cooperative behavior
of agents and thus promoting productive firm behavior. See Robert Cooter
& Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character and Efficiency in Firms, 149
U. PA L. REV. 1717 (2001). For a detailed review of some of the economic
literature on corporate culture, see BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, ECON. & CORP.
CULTURE (1999).
61 See Barney, supra note 46, at 657.

22

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 15.1

provides a helpful landscape for organizational behavior,
although understanding specific organizational,
commercial decisions, or both also requires a focused
examination of the business functions of the entity
concerned as well as its incentives, constraints, and a
variety of other factors that depend on the relevant facts
and circumstances.
B. COMPLIANCE AS AN INTERNAL FORCE FOR LAW

ENFORCEMENT

In many jurisdictions there has been an increasing
use of criminal sanctions and individual liabilities to
sanction cartel behavior. 62 However, empirical evidence
shows that the effectiveness of severe penalties is often
insufficient because business people often ignore or
rationalize messages they receive and their knowledge
about anti-cartel law is often limited. 63 For example, a
survey of 567 business people in Australia by Christine

62 See, e.g., Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Moral Wrongfulness and
Cartel Criminalization in East Asia, 36 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1-63
(forthcoming, 2019) (discussing the uneven but growing international trend
toward harsher penalties and criminal sanctions in cases where cartel laws
are violated).
63 See Christine Parker & Chris Platania-Phung, The Deterrent Impact
of Cartel Criminalisation: Supplementary Report on a Survey of Australian
Public Opinion Regarding Business People’s Views on Anti-Cartel Laws
and Enforcement http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026725 (last visited August 1,
2018).
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Parker and Chris Platania-Phung indicated that, although
at that time cartels had been criminalized for over a year
in Australia (since 2010), fewer than half of the
respondents realized that cartel behavior was a criminal
offense. 64 Furthermore, many of the respondents
believed that the risk of being caught for cartel activities
was low, and that, hypothetically speaking, they would
not be detected in the context of their own
circumstances. 65 More recently, a 2014 telephone
survey of around 1,200 private sector businesses in the
United Kingdom (UK) revealed that, despite higher
levels of awareness of competition law among large UK
enterprises compared to smaller firms, an overall
remarkably low rate of nineteen percent (19%) of the
respondent firms engaged in discussions at senior level
of the requirements of competition law (compared to a
seventy-eight percent (78%) rate for health and safety). 66
Only six percent (6%) of the respondents held

64

See id.
See id.
66 See IFF RESEARCH, UK BUS.’ UNDERSTANDING OF COMPETITION L.
28
(2015)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/429876/UK_businesses__understanding_of_competition_law__report.pdf. For discussion, see Barry Rodger, Competition Law
Compliance: The CMA 2015 Study, Compliance Rationales and the Need
for Increased Compliance Professionalism and Education, 36 EUR. COMP.
L. REV. 423 (2015).
65
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competition law training sessions for employees. 67 Only
twenty-three percent (23%) considered that they know
competition law well, and twenty percent (20%) had
never heard of it 68—a disappointing result later seized by
the UK Comptroller and Auditor General. 69 It is also
quite telling that nineteen percent of respondents thought
that the “Federal Trade Commission,” a rather
widelyknown organ of the American federal
government, was responsible for enforcing competition
law in the UK. 70
Considering the significant
transparency of the enforcement and outreach efforts of
the Office of Fair Trading and its successor, the
Competition and Markets Authority, these figures from
the UK can hardly bode well for other jurisdictions
worldwide. 71
Considering the findings from the above studies in
Australia and the UK, many observers and anti-trust
regulators recognize that merely increasing cartel
penalties and enhancing detection by means of leniency
programs are unlikely to achieve the goal of effective

See UK BUSINESSES’ UNDERSTANDING, supra note 66, at 5, 30.
Id. at 5, 31.
69 See The UK Competition Regime, UK NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, 8,
27-28 (2016), https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/TheUK-Competition-regime.pdf.
70 See UK BUSINESSES’ UNDERSTANDING, supra note 66, at 57.
71 See id. at 59.
67
68
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enforcement, unless, those measures are complemented
by suitable and widespread compliance programs. 72
C. COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE CULTURALLY DRIVEN

Much of the global debate about corporate
compliance in the field of competition law fails to push
past a discussion of the external consideration of carrots
and sticks and to consider compliance as an internal
force that can change values, norms, and behavior within
the corporation. 73 Seen from this perspective, culture
and cultural change within organizations should be high
on the agenda. 74 In light of the above-reviewed evidence

72
Some commentators recommend making the grant of immunity
under a leniency program conditional on the establishment of a welldesigned compliance program. See, e.g., Brent Fisse, Reconditioning
Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programmes a
Condition
of
Immunity,
https://www.brentfisse.com/images/Fisse_Compliance_Programs_as_Con
dition_of_Corporate_Immunity_201114.pdf
73 See, e.g., Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, 34-36 (arguing that the
discourse on competition law compliance should not only revolve around
punishment and penalty mitigation but should aim at changing the
“normative values” of the corporation).
74 On the importance of culture, see, e.g., LAI CHEN, THE CORE VALUES
OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION (2016); Calvin Boardman & Hideaki Kiyoshi
Kato, The Confucian Roots of Business Kyosei, 48 J. BUS. ETHICS 317, 318
(2003); Rick Hackett & Gordon Wang, Virtues and Leadership: An
Integrating Conceptual Framework Founded in Aristotelian and Confucian
Perspectives in Virtues, 50 MGMT. DECISION 868, 889 (2012); Liang-Hung
Lin & Yu-Ling Ho, Confucian Dynamism, Culture and Ethical Changes in
Chinese Societies—A Comparative Study of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,
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suggesting a strong relationship between organizational
culture and corporate performance, this article argues
that competition regulators and practitioners should shift
their focus from the deterrence-based enforcement
model towards a more culturally-driven compliance
model. 75 The debate on compliance, this article submits,
should not treat corporations as “black boxes”; such an
entity should instead be studied taking account of the
details of the corporate culture of the entity and the
manner in which that culture shapes norms and
behavior. 76 Since corporate culture in East Asia reflects
more than two millennia of Confucian civilizations, this
article will turn to an overview of the Confucian tradition
and its relevance to the present discussion.

20 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2402, 2043 (2009); Shu-hsien Liu, A
Philosophic Analysis of the Confucian Approach to Ethics, 22 PHIL. EAST &
WEST 417, 424 (1972).
75 See generally CHEN, supra note 74; Boardman & Kato, supra note
74 (explaining the effects of implementing kyosei virtues into corporate
culture to reward proper behavior); Hacket & Wang, supra note 74
(discussing the importance of leaders using confusion values in the business
world); Liang-Hung Lin & Yu-Ling Ho, supra note 74 (explaining cultural
transformation can diversify behaviors in a corporation); Shu-hsien Liu,
supra note 74 (discussing confusion ethics and its importance to achieving
rationality).
76 See Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, 46-48.
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III. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND CORPORATE CULTURE
IN EAST ASIA

A. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

The starting point for studying corporate culture in
East Asian companies is to understand the long and
profound tradition of Confucianism and its ethical
values, which have had a continuing influence on the
work attitudes of employees in modern organizations. 77
This tradition has even affected employees’ cognitive
processes and their metaphysical beliefs. 78
Confucianism, which is not a single strand of philosophy
but a family of related traditions that evolved over
centuries, 79 has had a dominant and enduring influence
on economic activities and business organizations in
East Asian countries. 80 In China, for example, a
Confucian system of self-regulated governance was a

See, e.g., Bih-Shiaw Jaw et al., The Impact of Culture on Chinese
Employees’ Work Values, 36 PERSONNEL REV. 128, 129-32 (2007).
78 See Richard Nisbett et al., Culture and System of Thought: Analytic
and Holistic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 299-305 (2001).
79 See Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and
Implications for Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT’L L. J. 1, 7 n.31 (2016)
(Confucianism consists not just of the contributions of Confucius himself
but on a “multitude of subsequent and sometimes famous scholars,
interpreters, and glossators,” leading to many sub-strands of Confucian
thought and ethics).
80 See Ma & Marquis, supra note 79, 9-10.
77
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functional equivalent for company law for centuries until
the first company law, largely transplanted from
European civil codes, was implemented in 1904. 81
Today, in mainland China and Hong Kong, Confucian
concepts are still relevant when businesses make
corporate governance decisions. 82 Confucianism has
likewise deeply influenced values in Korea and has
significantly shaped (together with other influences
including Christianity) inter-personal relations in both
social and work environments. 83 Confucianism in China
has enjoyed a cautious resurgence over the last three
decades; many of its fundamental precepts are
acknowledged and respected by the government,
particularly because it represents an alternative to
Western-style systems and ideologies. 84 In September
1999, the government officially celebrated the 2,550th

81 See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship:
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1677 (2000). See also Alex Chu Kwong Chan & Angus
Young, Chinese Corporate Governance Regime from a Historical-Cultural
Perspective: Rethinking Confucian System of Governance, 3 (2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156300 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018).
82 See Chan & Young, supra note 81, at 28.
83 See Tan Soo Kee, Influences of Confucianism on Korean Corporate
Culture, 36 ASIAN PROFILE 9, 9 (2008).
84 See e.g., Jeremy Page, Why China is Turning Back to Confucius,
WALL ST. J., (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-china-isturning-back-to-confucius-1442754000 (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
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birthday of Confucius in Qufu, his hometown in
Shandong Province. 85 Another celebration was held
worldwide in 2014 for Confucius’s 2,565th birthday. 86
With regard to business culture both in China and among
the widely dispersed Chinese diaspora, Confucian values
are indispensable to understanding the behavior,
organization, and management of family businesses. 87
It is significant that the East Asian business ethos did
not entirely lose its Confucianist character even when the
1997 financial crisis jolted the South Korean and
Japanese economies and prompted substantial reforms to
corporate governance. 88 As part of those reforms, and
following the Anglo-American model, independent

85 See Jun Yan & Ritch Sorenson, The Effect of Confucian Values on
Succession in Family Business, XIX FAM. BUS. REV. 235, 248 (2006).
86 See China Central Television News, broadcast of (Sept. 28, 2014)
(in Chinese), http://news.cntv.cn/special/jkr/index.shtml (last visited Aug.
1, 2018).
87 See Jean Lee, Culture and Management - A Study of Small Chinese
Family Business in Singapore, 34 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 63 (1996); Murray
Weidenbaum, The Chinese Family Business Enterprise, 38 CALIF. MGMT.
REV. 141 (1996); Richard Whitley, The Social Construction of Business
Systems in East Asia, 12 ORG. STUD. 1 (1991); Yan & Sorenson, supra note
85, at 248.
88 See Lilian Miles & S.H. Goo, Corporate Governance in Asian
Countries: Has Confucianism Anything to Offer?, 118 BUS. & SOC’Y REV.
23, 24-25, 37-38 (2013) (In relation to Japan, that “[l]ifetime employment,
collectivism, and pursuit of harmony continue to characterize Japanese
corporate governance, and the traditional keiretsu system of related party
transactions, reinforced by cross-shareholdings will continue to exist.”).
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directors were recruited and internal financial reporting
and corporate control were strengthened, yet many of the
core values defined by Confucian doctrine, such as
collectivism and the pursuit of harmony, remained
unchanged or have since re-emerged in East Asian
companies. 89 Janis Sarra and Masafumi Nakahigashi
have argued that, although the Commercial Code and the
Audit Special Exception Code took effect in Japan in
2003 and aimed at introducing Anglo-American
elements of corporate governance, local culture and
business norms in Japan should never be overlooked.90
The corporate board in Japan is still “like a small
community” with a consensus-building culture. 91
Workers’ representation on corporate boards is
dependent upon employees’ long-term loyalty and
commitment, and promotion depends to a large extent on
contributions to the team, rather than on individual
achievements. 92 According to Sarra and Nakahigashi,
although there has been a perception that Japanese
corporate law has shifted towards the corporate

89 See id. at 37-38 (stating in relation to China, the authors note “the
enduring influence of Confucius on Chinese culture, despite the ongoing
corporate governance reforms along Anglo-American lines”).
90 See Janis Sarra & Masafumi Nakahigashi, Balancing Social and
Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: The Evolution of Japanese
Corporate Structure and Norms, 24 LAW & POL’Y 299, 330 (2002).
91 See id.
92 See id. at 339.
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governance model prevalent in North America since the
Commercial Code was amended in 2003, the key
traditional elements in business ethnic and corporate
culture remain constant. 93
Moreover, the long-standing Confucian tradition is
also often manifested in informal institutions. 94 These
institutions play the role of guiding principles and
polices in doing business; they remove conflicts while
strengthening information flow, trust, and mutual
understanding within and among business firms. 95
Many have claimed that these informal institutions and
cultural norms bridge the gap between formal legal
institutions and the judicial system, and sometimes
provide more efficient solutions. 96
Collective behavioral and decision-making norms,
strong internal hierarchical relationships, moral values,

93

See id.
See Chenting Su et al., Enabling Guanxi Management in China: A
Hierarchical Stakeholder Model of Effective Guanxi, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 301
(2007).
95 See id.
96 See Ricky Y.K. Chan et al., The Dynamics of Guanxi and Ethics for
Chinese Executives, 41 J. BUS. ETHICS 327 (2002); see also Sven Horak &
Andreas Klein, Persistence of Informal Social Networks in East Asia:
Evidence from South Korea, 33 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 673, 677 (2016)
(“Several authors point out the efficiency and flexibility guanxi offers as a
substitute to sometimes unclear and frequently changing rules and policies.
In business, guanxi is effective in resolving conflicts more easily than the
judicial system.” (citations omitted)).
94
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and family and community ties are often regarded as
constituting typical Asian or Confucian values.” 97 In the
following sections, this article focuses on five main
aspects of corporate culture in East Asian companies that
derive from Confucianism influences. Specifically, this
article discusses: paternalistic leadership, family
ownership, corporate governance, rules of business
ethics, external relations (e.g., the relations between a
given enterprise and other entities), and social
responsibilities.
B. CONFUCIAN TRADITION AND CORPORATE CULTURE

While Confucian values and the Confucian ethical
system were originally designed for application at the
micro level in the family and at the macro level of the
government of the Chinese empire, they have also had a
defining role in East Asian commercial life. 98 Indeed,

97 See Russell Dalton & Doh Chull Shin, Weber’s Theory of Capitalism
in Confucian East Asia, CITIZENS, DEMOCRACY, AND MARKETS AROUND
THE PACIFIC RIM: CONGRUENCE THEORY AND POLITICAL CULTURE 159, 17479 (Russell Dalton & Doh Chull Shin eds., 2006) (As observed by Kim, the
literature highlights four dimensions of Asian values: familialism,
communalism, authority orientation, and work ethic.); see So Young Kim,
Do Asian Values Exist? Empirical Tests of the Four Dimensions of Asian
Values, 10 J. EAST ASIAN STUD. 315 (2010).
98 See, e.g., Marc Dollinger, Confucian Ethics and Japanese
Management Practices, 7 J. BUS. ETHICS 575, 575-76 (1988) (describing the
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the influence of Confucianism in the business
environment throughout East Asia has been credited for
the Asian values of hard work, education, thrift, and
social order that fueled the economic miracle of the four,
so-called, tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore). 99
In Korea, for example, Confucian values contributed
to the economic development and industrialization in the
1960s and 1970s. 100 There, the Confucian tradition was
fused with strong economic nationalism and provided an
important cultural and ideological basis for the economic
development of the country. 101 Important aspects of that
tradition—loyalty, respect for authority and for elders,
self-cultivation, and harmony in the workplace and in
families—were all incorporated as part of the modern
work ethic. 102 In the 1980s and 1990s, harmony,

importance of Confucian moral concepts and social duties in relation to
Japanese business management styles).
99 See Angus Young et al., Corporate Governance in China: The Role
of the State and Ideology in Shaping Reforms, 28 COMPANY LAWYER 204,
205 (2007). Use of the term “tigers” in reference to Hong Kong, South
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore seems to have been popularized originally by
the World Bank; See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 2, 24, 37-38 (1993).
100 See Andrew Eungi Kim & Gil-sung Pak, Nationalism,
Confucianism, Work Ethic and Industrialization in South Korea, 33 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 37, 39 (2003).
101 See id. at 45.
102 See id. at 44.
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solidarity, and cooperation were the most prominent
company mottos in South Korean enterprises. 103
“Family” is frequently used as a metaphor, both within
the company 104 and also to describe relationships with
other firms; for example, terms such as moche (“mother
company”) and jamaehoesa (“sister companies”) are
common expressions in business. 105
Analogous
vocabulary is found in Japan as well, as illustrated by the
terms oya gaisha (“parent company”), kogaisha (“child
company”),
and
magogaisha
(“grandchild
company”). 106 Of course, expressions such as parent
company and daughter company are also found in many
other parts of the world, but there may be somewhat
deeper psychological associations in countries where, as
in Japan, the company often assumes a family-like

103 See Roger Janelli, Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural
Construction of a South Korean Conglomerate, 239 (1993).
104 See, e.g., Yung-Ho Cho & Jeonkoo Yoon, The Origin and Function
of Dynamic Collectivism: An Analysis of Korean Corporate Corp. Culture,
7 Asian Pac. Bus. Rev. 70, 76 (2010) (noting that CEOs in Korea emphasize
“strong family-like bonds among employees,” and that CEOs adopt the role
of a father figure).
105 See Kim & Pak, supra note 100, at 44-5.
106 See Gregory Ornatowski, Confucian Values, Japanese Economic
Development, and the Creation of a Modern Japanese Ethics, INT’L BUS.
ETHICS: CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES 386, 395 (Georges Enderle ed.,
1999) (discussing Japanese business terms); Chan, supra note 32, at 348
(citing Ornatowski and referring to the same terms).
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role. 107 Furthermore, the prominence of Confucian
values in East Asian companies may also be
distinguished by the use of such values as motivational
tools. 108 In 1989, Hak Chong Lee conducted a survey of
seventy-seven (77) Korean companies and found that
words and phrases central to Confucian moral values,
such as diligence, social responsibility, unity, reliability,
and sacrifice, were emblazoned on the walls of factories,
offices, and elevators. 109 Lee found these values
positively motivated workers to make determined efforts
to achieve the goals of the company. 110
While Japan’s economic afflictions in the 1990s
sharply distinguished the country from the four tigers,
some of the same Confucian values have also profoundly
influenced Japanese business culture. 111 Famously,
loyalty to one’s organization or company, often as part
of a lifelong reciprocal commitment, is of crucial

107 On the traditional role of the Japanese company serving in some
circumstances as a substitute for the family, see Ma & Marquis, supra note
79, at 11 (f n.75) (“First-born sons in Japan inherited the family business
and other assets, leaving younger sons to strike out on their own with their
new employers assuming a role akin to an adopted family.”).
108 See Hak Chong Lee, Managerial Characteristics of Korean Firms,
KOREAN MANAGERIAL DYNAMICS 147, 160-61 (Kae Chung & Hak Chong
Lee eds., 1989) (achieving company goals was also regarded as consistent
with the goals of the nation).
109 See id. at 149.
110 See id. at 160-61.
111 See generally Dollinger, supra note 98.
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importance to employees. 112 When employees mention
their company, instead of saying they are “working for
Toyota,” they would say that they “belong to Toyota.”113
Similarly, when young people were recruited by large
companies in China, they moved from other parts of the
country to company dormitories and they called the
company their new home. 114 These young workers
expect companies to organize collective activities in the
spheres of culture, education, or sports, and to develop
their potential in a paternalistic environment. 115 In
Japan, senior managers require young employees to
listen to and obey their commands and promotion can
only be expected when the employees meet relevant age
requirements, which prove they have spent sufficient
time in the company. 116 Furthermore, loyalty and trust
are not only important for the relationship between
managers and employees, but also important for business
partners and even competitors to nurture and maintain. 117
Norimasa Furuta, then-President of Mazda, expressed a

See Ma & Marquis, supra note 76, at 27-28.
See Charles Rarick, The Philosophical Impact of Shintoism,
Buddhism, and Confucianism on Japanese Management Practices, 7 INT’L
J. VALUE-BASED MGMT. 219, 223 (1994).
114 See Colin Hawes, Representing Corp. Culture in China: Official,
Academic and Corp. Perspectives, 59 CHINA J. 33, 37 (2008).
115 See id.
116 See Rarick, supra note 113, at 224.
117 See id.
112
113
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typical sentiment in this regard as he once said in
reference to automobile manufacturers, “strategic
alliances” need to be formed with competitors and
suppliers in order to achieve success. 118 This article
interprets Furuta’s statement as reflecting a particular
ethos and worldview not driven merely by
considerations such as the integration of complementary
assets and the achievement of synergies.
C. INFLUENCES OF CONFUCIAN CULTURE ON THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

1. Paternalistic Leadership

The concept of role-based relationships emphasized
by Confucianism has had a profound influence on
business entities in East Asia. 119 By analogy to the
fundamental principle of filial piety in the family,
superiors expect employees at an inferior level to respect
them and follow orders. 120 Paternalistic leadership is

See id. at 223. See also Thomas Bellows, Bridging Tradition and
Modernization: The Singapore Bureaucracy, in CONFUCIANISM AND ECON.
DEV.: AN ORIENTAL ALTERNATIVE? 195, 195-96 (Hung-chao Tai ed., 1989).
119 See, e.g., John Hill, Confucianism and the Art of Chinese
Management, 1 J. ASIA BUS. STUD. 1, 8-9 (2006) (focusing on links between
Confucianism and elements of Chinese management culture such as its
emphasis on paternalism and personal relationships).
120 As one might expect, the exaltation of obedience has been
criticized, in particular because it may curb creativity in private and
professional settings. See Kyung Hee Kim, Exploring the Interactions
118
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another prominent feature of Chinese family businesses
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Indonesia. 121 In
a family enterprise, it is often the head of the family that
adopts the relevant business policies, and his decisionmaking power is highly authoritarian and
discretionary. 122 Supervisors expect subordinates to
implement their policy by interpreting the boss’s idea
carefully, and disagreements can only be expressed in a
polite, indirect way through private and personal
channels. 123 With the patriarch or the matriarch acting
as the head of the company, key members of the family
hold executive positions, and when kinships link
subsidiaries, a network of companies can be formed;

between Asian Culture (Confucianism) and Creativity, 41 J. CREATIVE
BEHAV. 28, 34 (2007) (“Overemphasis on following rules and traditions at
work creates organizational barriers to creative innovation …. Creative
potential is only realized in work situations where employees can influence
decision-making and communicate new ideas ….” (citations omitted));
Another obvious weakness of historical Confucianism is that it
systematically undervalued women and generally deprived them of voice.
See id. at 37-38.
121 See GORDON REDDING, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM 143,
156-69 (1990). See also Robert Westwood & Andrew Chan, Headship and
Leadership, in ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.: A SOUTHEAST ASIAN
PERSPECTIVE 123 (Robert Westwood ed., 1992).
122 See Gordon Redding, The Conditional Relevance of Corporate
Governance Advice in the Context of Asian Business Systems, 10 ASIA-PAC.
BUS. REV. 272, 285 (2004).
123 See Min Chen, Asian Management Systems 73 (2d ed. 2004).
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ownership is thus distributed throughout the family.124
Given the complex and sometimes concealed
relationships within the company, it often takes time for
an outsider, such as independent non-executive
directors, to access core information. For these reasons,
the role and functions of outsiders can be merely
symbolic. 125
The majority of leadership studies concerning
Chinese business organizations have concluded that
paternalistic rule is the prevalent leadership type. 126

See Ming-Jer Chen, Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for
Managers Worldwide 26 (2001).
125 See Angus Young, Corporate Governance in China and Hong
Kong: Reconciling Traditional Chinese Values, Regulatory Innovation and
Accountability 1, 12 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533904 (last visited
Aug. 2, 2018). The role of independent directors in Korea is likewise rather
limited. See also Amir Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance CrossListing, and Corporate Governance Reform 22 Berk. J. Int’l Law 195, 225
(2004) (“[A] truly independent director may be considered an outsider
rather than an outside director. Even if perceived as an integral part of the
group of board members (and to the extent that this is so), it would be
difficult for her to identify the complex cases and to ask the hard questions.
This is not to say that independent directors would be worthless in Korea
.… Yet the trend toward giving independent directors greater pride of place
is somewhat puzzling.”).
126 See Chin-Yi Chen et al., Spiritual Leadership, Follower Mediators,
and Organizational Outcomes: Evidence from Three Industries Across Two
Major Chinese Societies, 42 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 890, 923 (2012); BorShiuan Cheng et al., Paternalistic Leadership and Subordinate Responses:
Establishing a Leadership Model in Chinese Organizations, 7 ASIAN J. SOC.
PSYCH. 89, 90-92 (2004).
124
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Decision-making power is often centralized at the top or
at least at the level of senior management. 127 Michael
Witt and Gordon Redding’s study on the institutional
characteristics of thirteen Asian business systems
(mainland China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan,
Thailand, and Vietnam) shows that top-down decision making and internal hierarchical structures are
commonly observed in Asia. 128 Top managers usually
have the major decision-making power, and among the
above-mentioned thirteen systems, the only exception
was Japan, which features a participatory model. 129
Studies on the organizational culture in Chinese
firms have incorporated theories of management,
organizational science, and leadership behavior. 130

See Lee & Lee, supra note 50, at 37.
See Michael Witt & Gordon Redding, Asian Business Systems:
Institutional Comparison, Clusters and implications for Varieties of
Capitalism and Business Systems Theory, 11 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 270 (2013).
See also Jeffrey Podoshen et al., Materialsm and Conspicuous
Consumption in China: A Cross-Cultural Examination, 35 INT’L J.
CONSUMER STUD. 17, 18 (2011).
129 See Witt & Redding, supra note 128. See also Ma & Marquis, supra
note 79, at 16, 28 (discussing the unusual ringiseido system in corporate
Japan).
130 See generally Daniel Denison et al., Corporate Culture in Chinese
Organizations, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
CLIMATE 1, 561 (Neal Ashkanasy et al. eds., 2nd edn 2010); Denison &
Mishra, supra note 53, 205-07.
127
128
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Although the styles of management are clearly
influenced by multiple factors, few authors would
disagree that traditional values informed both the
philosophy management and the psychological
motivations underlying the behavior of employees and
employers. 131 A particular feature of the management
style of Chinese companies is the dominant role of
leaders, 132 who may be the local managers at foreign
firms doing business in China 133 or foreign-based

131 See Lee Cheuk Yin, Do Traditional Values Still Exist in Modern
Chinese Societies? The Case of Singapore and China, 1 ASIA EUR. J. 43,
57 (2003). Yin points out that traditionalism is not manifest uniformly in
Asian societies. Yin points out that “circumstances in various regions differ
greatly. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have a richer ambience of
indigenous cultural tradition, whereas Hong Kong and Singapore are more
‘‘westernized.’ … What the people [in the latter countries] still widely
accept and preserve are the basic tenets of individual moral conduct and
interpersonal relations in Confucianism. These do not come from classical
tradition, but mainly from implicit influence from within the family and
subtly internalized moral values. Some call this ‘secular Confucianism’ or
‘popular Confucianism,’ others deem it to be hybridized with Buddhist and
Taoist values and therefore can no longer be called ‘Confucianism.’
(footnotes omitted).
132 See Zhi-Xue Zhang et al., Business Leadership in the Chinese
Context: Trends, Findings, and Implications, 10 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 199,
204 (2014).
133 See Crystal Zhao, Management of Corporate Culture Through
Local Managers’ Training in Foreign Companies in China: A Qualitative
Analysis, 9 INT’L J. TRAINING & DVPMT 232, 232-35 (2005) (showing that
local managers play an important role in foreign companies located in
China, and that the main values, beliefs of foreign corporate culture are
mainly applied through the management practices of local managers).
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Chinese managers of Chinese firms operating
overseas. 134 In these settings of Chinese management,
leaders have a tendency to be less reliant on formal
contracts. 135 Leaders are paternalistic; and at least
ideally, they combine discipline, authority, fatherly
benevolence, and moral integrity. 136 Among East Asian
countries, hierarchical structures and paternalistic
leadership are especially prevalent in Chinese, 137 and
Korean companies. 138 The rules of the game are evident
down to the level of concrete behavioral ritual, for
example, in both China and Korea, elders as well as
persons of higher social status, are granted priority to
initiate activities, such as being the first to enter the

134 See Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FINAN. ECON. 81, 82-83 (2000); John Kao,
The Worldwide Web of Chinese Business, 71 HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 24 (1993).
135 See CHEN, supra note 123, at 80.
As Chen noted, “[i]n an
environment structures by the implicit rules of loyalty and mutual
obligation, a contract is seen as unnecessary at best and offensive at worst.
Historically, important deals have been executed among Chinese firms
without legal contracts of any kind.” A paper contract can symbolize
suspicion and fear, and it “implies that the obligations and loyalty of
partnership are not taken seriously, and it is rarely resorted to among
Chinese businesses as a means of protecting the parties against each other.”
136 See Zhang et al., supra note 132, at 204.
137 See Min Wu & Erica Xu, Paternalistic Leadership: From Here to
Where?, in HANDBOOK OF CHINESE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.:
INTEGRATING THEORY, RES. AND PRAC. 449 (Xu Huang & Michael Bond
eds., 2012).
138 See Kee, supra note 83.
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room, or being served food first during a business
banquet, and so on. 139 Senior officials, who are often the
decision makers, are unwilling to meet negotiating teams
with junior members. 140 A company expects a
hierarchical and reciprocal relationship—similar to the
respective roles of father and son—between superiors
and their subordinates. 141 Similar patterns are observed
in family firms and state-owned businesses, where
managers and employees tend to fulfill reciprocal
obligations; superiors expect subordinates to perform
duties and show respect, while subordinates expect
superiors to lead with loyalty, fairness and justice. 142 In
Korea, companies employ a highly centralized and topdown decision-making process. 143 Personnel policies
relate closely to seniority and embody unwavering
respect for elders. 144 In such an environment, the
authoritarian nature of leadership and decision-making
makes it difficult for employees to express dissenting
opinions. 145 The exchange of ideas during business

139 See Choong Lee, Korean Culture and Its Influence on Business
Practice in South Korea, 7 J. INT’L MGMT. STUD. 184, 186 (2012).
140 See id. at 187.
141 See Wei-Ming Tu, Probing the “Three Bonds” and “Five
Relationships” in Confucian Humanism, in CONFUCIANISM AND THE
FAMILY 121, 122-23 (Walter Slote & George De Vos eds., 1998).
142 See Kee, supra note 83, at 13.
143 See id. at 14.
144 See Lee, supra note 137, at 185.
145 See Kee, supra note 83, at 15.
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meetings, particularly between juniors and senior
managers, becomes infrequent and psychologically
challenging, leaving many insightful and creative views
unvoiced. 146 It is worth adding that, in this type of
environment where work relationships are highly
personal and relation-based, two studies conducted by
Zhen Xion Chen show that the performance of
employees correlates more strongly with their loyalty to
a supervisor than with commitment to the
organization. 147 Loyalty to the supervisor strongly
influences employees’ attitudes. 148
The above discussion highlights a contrast between
the structured, process-oriented style and rule-based
style that tends to characterize governance in the
West. 149 In East Asian business, as demonstrated above,
corporate governance is generally relation-based, topdown, structured, stable, informal, and less

146 See id. See also Kim, supra note 120, at 34 (referring to
organizational barriers to creative innovation arising from rigid business
hierarchies that dampen the input of subordinates in decision-making).
147 See Zhen Xiong Chen et al., Loyalty to Supervisor vs.
Organizational Commitment: Relationships to Employee Performance in
China, 75 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORG. PSYCHOL. 339, 343 (2002).
148 See Chen, supra note 147, at 340.
149 See Shaomin Li et al., The Great Leap Forward: The Transition
from Relation-Based to Rule-Based Governance, 33 ORG. DYNAMICS 63,
64-66 (2004).
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transparent. 150 However, paternalistic leadership is also
credited for the superior performance of many
multinational companies. First, Zhang Riumin, an
authoritarian but also benevolent CEO, led the Haier
Group to great commercial success. 151 Similarly, Li KaShing, Chairman of the Cheung Kong Group (today, CK
Hutchinson) has had enormous success with his
businesses and has become a legendary figure in Hong
Kong while earning the status of Knight Commander
(KBE) of the Order of the British Empire. 152 Having
experienced hardship and difficulties in wartime, Li
educated himself and has used Confucian principles
throughout his life. 153 In particular, he developed a
reputation for being polite, trustworthy, hardworking,

See Young, supra note 125, at 9.
Hawes and Chew attribute the success of the Haier Group to Zhang
Ruimin’s leadership. He defined the organizational culture, created the
firm’s value and incentivized all employees to work for the company. He
also accommodated the company’s 800 workers, kept them motivated and
provided them with improved working conditions. See Colin Hawes & Eng
Chew, The Cultural Transformation of Large Chinese Enterprises into
Internationally Competitive Corporations: Case Studies of Haier and
Huawei, 9 J. CHINESE ECON. & BUS. STUD. 67 (2011); Paul McDonald,
Confucian Foundations to Leadership: A Study of Chinese Business
Leaders Across Greater China and South-East Asia, 18 ASIA PAC. BUS.
REV. 465, 476 (2012); Ruimin Zhang, Raising Haier, 85 HARV. BUS. REV.
141 (2007).
152 See McDonald, supra note 151, at 477-78.
153 See id.
150
151
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philanthropic, and loyal to families. 154 His nickname in
Hong Kong, “Superman,” reflects both the success of his
family business and the exceptional esteem he earned
among the public in his country. 155 After a 68-year
career, Li is settling into retirement in 2018. 156
2. Family Ownership

Consistent with Confucian philosophy, many East
Asian companies treat their work environment like a
family household. for example, companies expect
managers and supervisors to play a role analogous to that
of family elders. 157 Employees often value the feeling of
belonging to a company—like the feeling of belonging
to a family—more than they value financial
compensation.” 158 Empirical studies in recent years
show that the majority of East Asian firms are owned by
families, 159 and family relationships play a key role in

154

See id.
See id. See also BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF NEW CHINESE
ENTREPRENEURS AND BUS. LEADERS 81 (Wenxian Zhang & Ilan Alon eds.,
2009).
156 See Luisa Kroll, Hong Kong’s Richest, Li Ka-shing, Announces
Plans to Retire After 68 Years, FORBES (March 16, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2018/03/16/hong-kongs-richest-lika-shing-announces-plans-to-exit-after-68-years/#57fd102d3436.
157 See Kee, supra note 83, at 14.
158 See Lee & Lee, supra note 50, at 36.
159 See Claessens et al., supra note 134, at 82.
155
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business organizations. 160 In Korea, many of the
sprawling conglomerates, i.e. the chaebol (Samsung
Electronics, The Hyundai Group, The LG Group,
Hanjing Group, The Ssangyong Group, etc.), are owned
and controlled by the families of their respective
founders. 161 It is the chairman’s eldest son or another
close family member, and not a professional manager,
that often becomes heir to the corporate throne. 162 In the
Taiwan region, research by Wen-Hsien Tsai on
Taiwanese family firms shows that, when the
performance and productivity of managers in family
firms are poor, the managers are more likely to be
replaced by other family members than by non-family
members. 163 The research also suggests family firms
change CEOs three times more often than non-family
firms, reflecting the prevalence of managerial-level
power struggles within the family. 164 Furthermore,

160 See Xiaowei Luo & Chi-Nien Chung, Keeping It All in the Family:
The Role of Particularistic Relationships in Business Group Performance
During Institutional Transition, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 404, 410 (2005).
161 See Kee, supra note 83, at 16-18.
162 See Sang-Woo Nam, Business Groups Looted by Controlling
Families, and the Asian Crisis, 27 ASIAN DEV. BANK INST. RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES
1,
21
(2001),
<https://thinkasia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/4133/2001.11.rp27.controlling.families.cr
isis.pdf?sequence=1>.
163 See Wen-Hsien Tsai et al., CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and
Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective, 19 FAM. BUS. REV. 11,
12 (2006).
164 See id.
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networks within families are self-dependent and
closed. 165 In Hong Kong, research by Henry Wai-chung
Yeung shows closed networks may include non-family
members, but only when they can develop “family-like
trust.” 166 This occurred in the case of Hong Kong Toys
Ltd. when the Hong Kong-based family firm developed
its new markets in Singapore. 167 It is argued that
Confucian values contribute to the success of overseas
Chinese family firms, and that these firms value mutual
obligations, cooperation, frugality and hard work—
elements which mitigate the classic principal-agency
problem where authority is delegated to company
managers. 168
The subject of family ties also raises the topic of
interpersonal networks, specifically as they relate to
relationships between family businesses and non-family

165 See Sun-Ki Chai & Mooweon Rhee, Confucian Capitalism and the
Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms, 6 MGMT. &
ORG. REV. 5, 16 (2010).
166 See Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Limits to the Growth of Familyowned Business? The Case of Chinese Transnational Corporations from
Hong Kong, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 55 (2000).
167 See id.
168 See Irene Yeung & Rosalie Tung, Achieving Business Success in
Confucian Societies: The Importance of Guanxi (Connections), 25 ORG.
DYNAMICS 54 (1996); Lee Jean & Francis Tan, Growth of Chinese Family
Enterprises in Singapore, 14 FAM. BUS. REV. 49 (2001); Eric Tsang,
Internationalizing the Family Firm: A Case Study of a Chinese Family
Business, 39 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 88; Whitley, supra note 87.

2019

CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE

49

partners or clients. In mainland China, the business
network system is often called guanxi. 169 In the context
of guanxi, it is important for entities outside the family,
such as business partners or clients, to maintain a
reciprocal relationship with the family business. 170
Long-term, interpersonal relationships are highly valued,
and often family businesses prefer to hire family
members and their relatives. 171 These relationships are
hierarchal in nature; when conflicts arise, the person of
lower status is expected to find ways of compromise
without open confrontation. 172
In Korea, the relations established through kin,
school, or regional ties are defined as yongo. 173 Similar

169 See Chao Chen et al., Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and
New Directions for Future Research, 9 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 167 (2013) (for
a review of different guanxi ties).
170 See Jun Yan & Ritch Sorenson, The Influence of Confucian
Ideology on Conflict in Chinese Family Business, 4 INT’L J. CROSS CULT.
MGMT. 5, 11 (2004).
171 See id.
172 See id. at 11. See also Yan & Sorenson, supra note 85, at 237 (“The
basic unit of society is not the individual, but the family. Family is always
more important than any individual member, and harmony is the most
important value for all family members. Without harmony, no family can
stand, neither can a family business.”). See Joyce Leong et al., Perceived
Effectiveness of Influence Strategies in the United States and Three Chinese
Societies, 6 INT’L J. CROSS CULT. MGMT. 101 (2006), showing that, in
contrast to the case of managers in the United States, gentle persuasion may
not be an effective management tool in mainland China.
173 See Horak & Klein, supra note 96, at 675.

50

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 15.1

to guanxi networks, the less formal institution of yongo,
which delineates between in-group and out-group trust
levels, is considered an efficient alternative to markets
and hierarchies in business transactions. 174 Yongo can
be developed through sharing the same bases of
experience such as the same home town (Jiyon), the
same school (Hakyon), or sharing blood ties or indirect
family ties through marriage (Hyulyon). 175 Therefore, it
is typical for a Korean to simultaneously belong to
various associations within the loyalty-based yongo
network, and yongo is commonly used for daily
interactions such as exchanging favors, gathering
information or attaining career achievements. 176
Hierarchical relationships are a predominant feature of
the yongo network, and it is often the case that a senior
can ask a favor from a junior but not vice versa. 177 The
yongo concept is similar to another concept—yonjul—
which also refers to an interpersonal network but which
is used for a particular and often dubious purpose: for

174 See id.; see also SEOK-CHUN LEW, THE KOREAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PATH: CONFUCIAN TRADITION, AFFECTIVE NETWORK (2013);
Jaehyuck Lee, Society in a Vortex? Yonjul Network and Civil Society in
Korea, 40 KOR. J. 366 (2000); Jaeyeol Yee, The Social Networks of
Koreans, 40 KOR. J. 325 (2000).
175 See Horak & Klein, supra note 96, at 675.
176 See id.
177 See id.
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example, personal gain through unfair or deceitful
means. 178
3. Business communities

As mentioned previously, many business networks in
East Asia are structured through personal relations and
family ties. The guanxi system in China encompasses
and shapes both the internal relations among family
members and the complex connections between a given
entity and its business partners, clients and
shareholders. 179 Individuals and business operators are

178 See Sven Horak, Antecedents and Characteristics of Informal
Relation-Based Networks in Korea: Yongo, Yonjul and Inmaek, 20 ASIAN
PAC. BUS. REV. 78, 89 (2014), (“Yonjul refers to informal and rather
particular ties between individuals that exist for a purpose. The word itself
shares with the word Yongo the ‘yon,’ again standing for ‘tie’, but the
second syllable—the ‘jul’—translates to ‘rope’ or ‘string.’ The common
judgement based on the interviews conducted is that the word Yonjul itself
has a rather negative connotation …, as Yonjul presupposes a purpose or
intention and objective, such as personal gains. The purpose of Yonjul ties
is often to secure favours or benefits granted because of those ties, and not
based on fair competition or equal treatment. Examples include, on the
individual level, the usage of Yonjul for job entry, career progression or the
acquisition of secret competition-relevant information or, on an
organizational level, receiving subsidies or securing monopoly rights in the
market …. Based on the interviews conducted it is clear that Yonjul blurs
the border between legality and illegality and is often associated with illegal
transactions.” (citations omitted)).
179 See Sun-Ki Chai, supra note 165; see Wen-Hsien Tsai, supra note
163; see also Henry Wai-chung Yeung, supra note 166.
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interdependent; network circles are cross-connected. 180
In Japan, as William Laufer and Iwao Taka have
explained, interest groups in one circle often constitute a
part of another circle, and the hierarchies in each circle
sometimes overlap. 181 Politics play a role as well: for
example, a company executive may also be a politician’s
supporter, or he may be a member of one of the advisory
councils, known as shingikai, that provide input to public
bodies on questions of policy. 182 Among business
circles, the government is viewed as having the highest
position in all the hierarchies within a given industry.183
Government intervention at all levels of the society has
traditionally been widely accepted and has even been

180 See William Laufer & Iwao Taka, Japan, Regulatory Compliance,
and the Wisdom of Extraterritorial Social Controls, 18 HAST. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 487, 505, 521 (1995).
181 See id. at 521.
182 See id. Shingikai are often composed of representatives from
business, academia, and other sectors to deal with policy questions and
specialized administrative issues. Since industries and market actors
generally hope to maintain a good relationship with the regulatory agency,
regulations and polices are rarely challenged or criticized. See Curtis
Milhaupt, A Rational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract
Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 3, 31 (1996).
183 See Laufer & Taka, supra note 180, at 521 (“Private corporations
or industries, in particular, view the government as occupying the highest
position in the industrial hierarchies. The government is also perceived as
an important interconnection among different hierarchies.”).
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perceived as natural and necessary. 184 Attempts have
been made since 2001 to draw sharper distinctions
between the State and the market, and in the field of
competition policy Japan’s engagement is more
convincing today than it once was. 185 Still, the burden
of history is not easily shrugged off: structural reforms
have often been stymied, and the interconnections
between industry, politicians, and agencies of the State
remain significant. 186 The relatively stable hierarchies
that are part of those interdependent circles generate

184 See id. at 521 (bureaucratic informalism is “underwritten by a
consensus among citizens that bureaucratic intervention and informal
coordination are necessary and meaningful.”). See also FRANK UPHAM,
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 207 (1987) (extensive
discussion of Japan’s bureaucratic informalism).
185 See, e.g., Mel Marquis, Firebird Suite: Cartel Suppression Reborn
in Japan, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF. 84 (2016).
186 See William Pesek, Corporate Japan Thinks it’s 1985,
BLOOMBERGVIEW,
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-0615/corporate-japan-thinks-it-s-1985 (last visited August 2, 2018) (“Abe’s
new initiatives are no match for Japan's traditional ‘iron triangle’—the
clubby nexus of elected officials, bureaucrats and CEOs that has long
dominated Japan's economy and resisted any prime minister who dared
challenge them. That’s not to say change isn’t afoot. Aside from nudging
corporate boards to add more outsiders and women, Abe’s new regulations
have forced companies to disclose their policies on cross-shareholdings and
the exercise of shareholder voting rights. And it’s a sign of progress that
Japan Exchange recently declared it is ‘ashamed’ at Toshiba’s accounting
scandal.”); see also, Richard Colignon & Chikaku Usui, The Resilience of
Japan’s Iron Triangle, 41 ASIAN SURV. 865 (2001).
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resistance against changes to the status quo. 187 Longstanding and stable interconnected relationships have
become a particular characteristic intrinsic to social and
commercial life in Japan. 188 Corporations have
traditionally prioritized the goal of maintaining stable
and predictable relationships with other actors (including
competitors), and this value originates from the Japanese
conception of “co-existence” or “co-survival” whereby
opportunities for cooperation and mutual benefit arise
when, proverbially speaking, people “eat from the same
rice pot” (onaji kama no meshi wo kū). 189

187

at 522.

See Pesek, supra note 186. See also Laufer & Taka, supra note 180,

See Sung-Joon Roh, Evolution of “Partnership Rationality” in
Japan: The Logic of Collaboration between Rival Firms, 22 BUS. & ECON.
HIST. 138, 141 (1993).
189 See id. at 145. The present authors have provided the relevant
Japanese expression and have loosely translated it as “eating from the same
rice pot” to capture the sense in English whereas Roh refers to rivals eating
rice together. The expression onaji kama no meshi wo kū dates back to the
Tokugawa period in which samurai apprentices lived in common
dormitories, shared experiences and thereby developed a sense of
brotherhood, bondedness and solidarity. See Thomas Tudor et al.,
Significant Historic Origins That Influenced the Team Concept in Major
Japanese Companies, 12 J. APP. BUS. RES. 115, 123 (1996) (citing ROBERT
MARCH, WORKING FOR A JAPANESE COMPANY: INSIGHTS INTO THE
MULTICULTURAL WORKPLACE (1992)).
188
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D. CORPORATE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN
CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Among various models on the study of
organizational culture, the Competing Values
Framework is one of the most influential models applied
internationally to test the impact of culture on
organizational
effectiveness,
change,
and
performance. 190 The Competing Values Framework is
also one of the few models that has been used extensively
in studying Asian firms. 191 This model, which was first
developed by Robert Quinn and John Rohrbaugh,
identifies
two
dimensions
of
organizational
effectiveness: the vertical axis of stability and control
versus flexibility and discretion, and the horizontal axis
of internal focus versus external focus. 192 Cameron and
Quinn later proposed attributes corresponding to the four
types of organizational culture: Clan, “Adhocracy”,

See Kim Cameron & Robert Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing
Organizational Culture Based on the Competing Values Framework (3rd
edn, 2011).
191 See David Ralston et al., Today’s State-owned Enterprises of
China: Are They Dying Dinosaurs or Dynamic Dynamos?, 27 Strat. Mgmt.
J. 825, 830 (2006).
192 See Robert Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, A Competing Values
Approach to Organizational Effectiveness, 5 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY REV. 122
(1981); Robert Quinn & John Rohrbaugh, A Spatial Model of Effectiveness
Criteria: Towards a Competing Values Approach to Organizational
Analysis, 29 MGMT. SCI. 363 (1983).
190

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

56

VOL. 15.1

Market, and Hierarchy. 193 Clan culture is concerned
with interpersonal loyalty, relationship building,
teamwork, trust, and commitment. 194 It has a flexible
internal orientation and indicates the family-type
atmosphere of the organization. 195 Adhocracy culture
emphasizes entrepreneurship, experimentation, and
innovation, and attaches importance to individual
initiative and freedom to react to quick market changes
and develop new strategies. 196 It has a flexible external
orientation. 197
Market culture values market
competition, competitiveness, and results, with a focus
on control and external “winning.” 198 Market culture
aims at maximizing productivity and profits through
assessable goals and procedures. 199 Hierarchy culture is
dominated by internal control and bureaucratic,
formalized rules and procedures. 200 An organization
with hierarchy culture is governed by predictable and
stable policies. 201

See Cameron & Quinn, supra note 190, at 41-50.
See id.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id. See also Ralston et al., supra note 191, at 832.
193
194
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The following three subsections explain the
relevance of the above-described Competing Values
Framework for the three jurisdictions discussed in this
article: China, Japan, and Korea. Highlighted are
empirical findings that have emerged by reference to the
Competing Values Framework approach.
1. China

Despite more than two decades of reform, Stateowned enterprises (SOEs) are still pervasive in China’s
economy; there is no way to seriously discuss economic
activity or business culture in China without reference to
SOEs. 202 SOEs followed a clan organizational culture
prior to China’s decision to transition to a more open,
market-based economy in 1978. 203 Under the centrally planned economic system, employees were strongly
oriented toward the internal factors of stability and
production, and they treated their organization like a
family. 204 However, David Ralston has shown that the
organizational culture of Chinese SOEs post-1978 has
been shifting from a clan/hierarchy culture toward a
market culture, with the least focus on Adhocracy

See generally Sheng Hong & Zhao Nong, CHINA’S STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES: NATURE, PERFORMANCE AND REFORM (2013).
203 See Ralston et al., supra note 191, at 832.
204 See id.
202
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(innovation, experimentation, and change). 205 The
executive management system used by SOEs reflects the
significant influence of Chinese political institutions.
This system utilizes an institutionalized personnel
rotation scheme similar to the management of civil
servants in the government. In this system, executives
are mainly incentivized by political promotion. 206 Top
managers of SOEs are frequently rotated across business
groups to reduce the concentration of managerial power
and to promote management skillsharing among
SOEs. 207 Empirical studies show that the managerial
culture of SOEs is “hierarchical” and “paternalistic,” and
that decision-making power is concentrated. 208
The authors in the above-mentioned Ralston survey
compared the organizational cultures of SOEs to privateowned enterprises and foreign-controlled businesses. 209
Their data sample was 435 Chinese managers from three

See id. at 839.
See generally Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate
Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach, 3 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 743 (2013).
207 See id.
208 See id.; See also Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu et al., Development of HR
Practices in Transitional Economies: Evidence from China, 19 INT’L J.
HUMAN RES. MGMT. 840 (2008); Siew-Huat Kong, An Empirical
Investigation of Mainland Chinese Organizational Ideology, 5 ASIAN BUS.
& MGMT. 357 (2006).
209 See Ralston, supra note 191.
205
206
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ownership types, and the average age of the respondents
was 35. 210 Their findings show that the executives
running SOEs have learned market-oriented
management styles, market strategies, and business
values. 211 In contrast, privately owned enterprises are
least focused on structure and control (Hierarchy or
Market culture), and instead they are most oriented
toward Clan culture, followed by Adhocracy. 212 The
authors also found that the organizational culture of
foreign-owned enterprises is balanced across the four
types, reflecting a managerial strategy of balancing
traditional Chinese culture with commercial constraints
and logic. 213
2. Japan

The Competing Values Framework described above
has been applied to assess organizational culture in

See id. at 835.
See id. at 838-41. At page 839, the authors state that their findings
are “understandable in the sense that management education or learning the
Western style management theories and practices has been a priority in
[China’s] reform strategy …. SOE managers, who have been influenced by
what they have learned about Western business practices, have apparently
applied them in their organizations.” (citation omitted)).
212 See id. at 839.
213 See id.
210
211
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Japanese businesses as well. 214 From October to
December 2009, Masaki Sugita and Takuya Takahashi
surveyed numerous Japanese corporations appearing in
the environmental management rankings of a leading
daily newspaper called Nippon Keizai Shinbunsya. 215
The survey, which returned 109 responses, divided
corporations into their cultural types, as summarized in
Tables 1 and 2. 216 The Tables are divided into a
manufacturing category (76 respondents) and a nonmanufacturing (services) category (33 respondents). 217
The authors of the survey found that Adhocracy culture
(experimentation and innovation) was positively
correlated with the better performance in terms of
environmental
management
or
sustainability
management. 218 By contrast, excessive Hierarchy
culture (high stability, predictability, control, and an
internal focus) correlated negatively with environmental
management performance. 219 For present purposes, it is
worth noting that Market culture type (demanding
leaders, results, and winning) and Hierarchy culture

214 Masaki Sugita & Takuya Takahashi, Influence of Corporate
Culture on Environmental Management Performance: An Empirical Study
of Japanese Firms, 22 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVIRON. MGMT. 182 (2015).
215 See id.
216 See id. at 186.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 187.
219 See id.
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(formality, structure, and efficient procedures) are
relatively prevalent in both manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing cultures. 220 While inferences must
remain tentative since industry-specific data are not
included, these figures may to some extent reflect both
the competitive pressures that shape the highproductivity side of Japan’s “dual” economy 221 and the
adherence to formality and ritualized norms in Japanese
society. 222 However, the finding of a Market culture in

See id. at 186.
Many authors have written about Japan’s dual economy, consisting
of high- (but declining) productivity sectors driven by competition and lowproductivity sectors (including service sectors) where dynamism was often
dampened by weak competition and sometimes ill-conceived economic
policies; in some cases there are links between two sides of the productivity
gap since, for example, inputs from low-productivity sectors may make it
harder for high-productivity sectors to reach their full potential in terms of
competitiveness. For discussion, see, e.g., WILLIAM LEWIS, THE POWER OF
PRODUCTIVITY: WEALTH, POVERTY AND THE THREAT TO GLOBAL STABILITY
23-49 (2004); RICHARD KATZ, JAPANESE PHOENIX: THE LONG ROAD TO
ECONOMIC REVIVAL 40-58 (2003). See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: JAPAN
OVERVIEW 26-28 (2017) (graphically depicting a decline of productivity in
Japan in manufacturing and especially non-manufacturing sectors and
making recommendations to boost productivity).
222 As McVeigh and others have pointed out, formality and ritualized
practices permeate Japanese social life. See Brian McVeigh, Ritualized
Practices of Everyday Life: Constructing Self, Status, and Social Structure
in Japan, 8 J. RITUAL STUD. 53 (1994). There is a “constant emphasis” on
ceremony and ritual behavior, and the rules of social convention make it
imperative to know the “right way” to do things. Id. at 60-64. At the same
time, the formality of procedures in Japanese companies co-exists with
220
221
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a significant number (14 of 33) nonmanufacturing
organizations is somewhat counter-intuitive given the
relatively low level of productivity in Japan’s
nonmanufacturing sectors. 223

informal modes of decision-making. See Caslav Pejovic, Japanese
Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
483, 504 (2011) (“In Japan the formal processes are rigid top-down
involving a kind of ritual formality with importance given to seals and do
not allow much deviation from the established rules. On the other hand, the
informal processes are far more flexible and have a very different logic with
great importance given to consensus and collective participation in making
a decision. This informal way of making decisions through various forms
of meetings and communications is based on personal relations rather than
on formal ways of communication.”).
223 The persistence of low productivity in Japan’s service industries is
underlined by Haruhiko Kuroda, the current governor of the Bank of Japan.
As Kuroda points out, the service sector continues to lag behind
manufacturing, and productivity in services is only around 70 percent of the
levels prevailing in the US and Europe. See Leika Kiraha, BOJ Kuroda
Calls for Raising Japan’s Service-Sector Productivity, REUTERS BUSINESS
NEWS (March 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japaneconomy-boj/boj-kuroda-calls-for-raising-japans-service-sectorproductivity-idUSKCN1GR0E0 (last visited August 5, 2018).
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Table 1 Japanese Manufacturing Corporation
Initiatives According to Cultural Types
(Total number = 76)

Cultural type

Number (out of 76 total)

Clan

16

Adhocracy

4

Market

20

Hierarchy

26

Clan/Market

3

Clan/Hierarchy

4

Adhocracy/Market

1

Market/Hierarchy

2
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Table 2 Japanese Nonmanufacturing
Cooperation Initiatives According to Cultural Types
(Total number = 33)

Cultural Type

Number (out of 33 total)

Clan

5

Adhocracy

1

Market

14

Hierarchy

9

Clan/Market

2

Market/Hierarchy

2

3. Korea

According to a number of studies, Korean
organizations score most highly for Hierarchy culture,
followed by Clan culture and Market (results-focused)
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culture. 224 Their lowest score is for Adhocracy
(entrepreneurial) culture. 225 Other studies corroborate
the finding that Korean organizational culture is largely
associated with Hierarchy culture. 226 In a comparative
study, Ali Dastmalchian examined organizational culture
in thirty-nine (39) Canadian and forty (40) Korean
organizations operating in six different industries. 227
Their data shows that Korean firms, when compared to
Canadian organizations, exhibit more hierarchy culture
and are characterized by greater tendencies toward
rigidity and control. 228 Historically, Korean corporate
culture offered some advantages, leading to the
observation that some traditional work culture—like
loyalty to organizations and superiors, readiness to take
and execute orders without questioning and sacrificing
private life—were part of the force that drove the
government-led economic development and the

224 See Ali Dastmalchian et al., The Interplay Between Organizational
and National Cultures: A Comparison of Organizational Practices in
Canada and South Korea Using the Competing Values Framework, 11 INT.
J. HUMAN RES. MGMT. 388 (2000).
225 See id. at 392.
226 See id. at 392-94.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 402, 408 (“the predominance of the hierarchy culture
among Korean firms irrespective of the industry is apparent from the six
graphs”; “Canadian organizations showed a considerably higher climate of
openness and lower climate of rigidity and control than the Korean
sample.”).
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consequent expansion of the Korean corporate sector
during the past several decades. 229 However, recent
assessments suggest that the traditional tendencies
toward authoritarianism and rigidity in business are
holding Korean companies back and hampering their
global competitiveness. 230
E. INCORPORATING CONSIDERATIONS OF CORPORATE
CULTURE IN COMPETITION COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES
IN EAST ASIA

It has been noted that Confucian philosophy has
substantially influenced the values and cultural norms
that are prevalent in East Asia. 231 Particularly, it is
suggested that guanxi-type networks, which are
generally rigid hierarchy-based internal structures, and
family ownership are particular features that distinguish
East Asian corporate governance from modern
governance approaches in the West. 232 In the light of

229 See Editorial notes:
Change work culture to improve
competitiveness: The Korea Herald, THE STRAITS TIMES (March 21, 2016),
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/change-work-culture-toimprove-competitiveness-the-korea-herald (last visited August 5, 2018).
230 See id. (referring to studies linking poor “organizational health” to
indicators such as top-down command structures, frequent demands that
employees perform work after hours, unproductive internal meetings, and
unfair job performance assessments).
231 See supra section 1.
232 See supra section 3.
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research showing that a high degree of “traditionality” is
relevant to the manner in which employees interact with
their employers, it is expected that these features of East
Asian business culture and governance are liable to
significantly impact the effectiveness of competition
compliance programs. 233 Internal control mechanisms
may lose their power when employees are concerned that
reporting misconduct will affect long-term relations, or
when employees at different levels of a company tend to
fulfill their duties and obligations based on implicit
guanxi rules or the equivalent of such rules. In relation
to such control mechanisms, Irwin has explained that in
view of “the Confucian values of loyalty to one’s group,
respect for superiors in a hierarchy, and avoiding loss of
‘face,’ the willingness of Chinese to speak up or ‘blow
the whistle’ on fellow employees if they become aware
of [an] unethical practice is low.” 234
The investments that firms make in achieving
compliance with regulation is often motivated according

See Larry Farh et al., Individual-level Cultural Values as
Moderators of Perceived Organizational Support-Employee Outcome
Relationships in China: Comparing the Effects of Power Distance and
Traditionality, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 715 (2007); showing that employees
with high traditionality in China would react to their employers in
accordance to social role obligations.
234 Judith Irwin, Doing Business in China: An Overview of Ethical
Aspects, INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS ETHICS OCCASIONAL PAPER 6, 16 (2012),
https://www.ibe.org.uk/userfiles/chinaop.pdf (last visited August 5, 2018).
233
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to the expected financial consequences and benefits,
including the value of avoiding the pain of legal
sanctions. 235 However, in light of the cultural
specificities discussed in this article, it is suggested that
more attention should be given to these other factors. In
the following subsections, the implications of the
Confucian tradition and of local norms for developing
effective competition compliance in East Asian
companies are discussed. Particular attention will be
given to the duties incumbent on CEOs and senior
managers, the role of the compliance officer, internal
control mechanisms, and the education function of the
compliance program.
1. Competition Compliance Programs

Compliance programs are designed to perform three
main functions. The first function is to educate personnel
and to provide relevant information about what types of
conduct are prohibited by antitrust or competition law.236
The second is to signal to the outside world that the

235 See, e.g., Donald Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 933, 937 (2017) (stating the basic formula that “[i]f the law
imposes the right mix of detection and sanctions, firms will for that reason
alone have an incentive to take steps to reduce legal risk” but also
recognizing the practical complications arising from imperfect detection
and a range of other factors).
236 See, e.g., Wils, supra note 19.
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company has the commitment and determination to
comply with competition rules, which contributes to
building a positive brand for “ethical businesses.” 237
And the third function is to either prevent
anticompetitive behavior or, if misconduct has already
occurred, to detect that misconduct, preferably at an
early stage. 238 It has been said that the goal of a
compliance program is to let the businessman feel the
antitrust laws, and to make him think twice before
engaging in conduct liable to constitute a violation.239
This palpable awareness of the law and its consequences
will thus create conditions in which cartel activity is
more likely to be avoided. 240 This perspective may not
be sufficiently ambitious. While it is necessary to clearly
disseminate information that enables a potential
infringer to consider the risks and rewards of illicit

See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 35.
Early detection by a company (by way of internal audit and/or
effective compliance efforts) of its own cartel infringement may enable it to
benefit from immunity or leniency in any subsequent public enforcement
proceedings; in some jurisdictions this may also secure benefits for the
company in the context of private damages claims. See, e.g., William
Kolasky, Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective,
address before the Corporate Compliance 2002 Conference, San Francisco,
July 12, 2002, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/224389.pdf (last
visited August 8, 2018) (discussing the detection function of compliance
programs).
239 See James Withrow, Compliance with the Antitrust Laws, 9 N.Y. L.
F. 187, 194 (1963).
240 See Kolasky, supra note 238, at 14.
237
238
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conduct, the deeper objective should be to trigger a
change in the logic of appropriateness that sets the
parameters of conduct of that agent. 241 If such a change
is achieved, the agent will act ethically—not necessarily
due to the hypothetical consequences of a legal regime
external to the business organization, but as a function of
the standards for exemplary behavior within the
environment of the organization.242
Although there is no internationally accepted onesize-fits-all template of a competition compliance

241 On the logic of appropriateness, which may be contrasted with (but
which in some specific circumstances may overlap and interact with) the
logic of consequences, see James March & Johan Olsen, The Logic of
Appropriateness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 689
(Goodin et al. eds., 2008). March and Olsen summarize this concept as
follows: “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective that sees human
action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized
into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural,
rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfill the obligations
encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community
or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions.
Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for
themselves in a specific type of situation.” Id. at 689. A general account is
given in JAMES MARCH & JOHAN OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS
(1989). For the important point that the logic of appropriateness and the
logic of consequences should not be regarded as necessarily mutually
exclusive, see Kjell Goldman, Appropriateness and Consequences: The
Logic of Neo-Institutionalism, 18 GOVERNANCE 35 (2005).
242 See March & Olsen, supra note 241.
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program, 243 and though competition authorities have not
officially agreed upon uniform contents for a “good”
compliance program, 244 many scholars have listed a
number of key elements that should be incorporated

The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
Working Group on Bribery issued the first international compliance and
ethics program standard in 2009. The basic elements of this standard are
applicable to any type of compliance program. See OECD Recommendation
of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International
Business
Transactions,
November
26,
2009,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44176910.pdf (last visited August 8,
2018). See also Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 375. Murphy and
Boehme referred to the 2010 version of the Canadian Competition Bureau’s
Bulletin on Compliance Programs as an excellent example. See Joseph
Murphy & Donna Boehme, Fear No Evil: A Compliance and Ethics
Professionals’
Response
to
Dr.
Stephan
(2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965733 (last visited August 8, 2018). See also
Joseph Murphy, Good News from Canada for the Compliance & Ethics
Profession, 6 COMP. & ETHICS MAG. 34 (2009). The Canadian Competition
Bureau has issued revised Bulletins in 2015 and 2018 which have been
influential.
244 See Lachnit, Compliance Programmes, supra note 5, at 41. See also
Pier Luigi Parcu & Maria Luisa Stasi, Antitrust Compliance Programs in
Europe: Status Quo and Challenges Ahead, EUI/RSC POLICY BRIEF 2016/1
(2016),
2,
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/39644/ENTraNCE_PB_2016_
01.pdf?sequence=3 (“While there seems to be a wide and increasing
consensus among public and private stakeholders around the benefits of
compliance programs, such benefits are identified and present only in cases
of ‘good’ programs. Thus, the main challenge lays in the identification of
what is a ‘good’ compliance program, in order to elaborate best practices
for its implementation.”).
243
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within such a program. 245 These include, for example:
the genuine support of senior managers; the appointment
of an ethics and compliance officer; the maintenance of
an internal auditing, monitoring, and reporting system;
effective communications to ensure that employees are
fully informed; frequent evaluation of the compliance
program and improvements where necessary; and
appropriate risk assessments for anticompetitive
conduct. 246 These ingredients may be further tailored
and scaled up or down according to a variety of factors
such as, among others: the size of a company, its
sophistication and resources, its compliance record, the

See, e.g., William Lawrence, Protecting Against Problems—
Corporate Compliance Programs, 57 ANTITRUST L. J. 601 (1988); Kate
Taylor & John Pratt, Anti-Trust Compliance Programs, 8 INT’L BUS. L. J.
981 (1994); Joseph Murphy, How DG Competition and US DOJ Antitrust
Division Hurt Compliance Efforts, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Feb. 2012) 1;
Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 381.
246 See Lawrence, supra note 245; Taylor & Pratt, supra note 245, at
984-85; Murphy, supra note 245, at 4-5; Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at
381. Murphy has argued that the necessary management techniques are very
extensive, and that there is no easy way to reduce them to a simple list. A
good compliance program should employ the full range of compliance
techniques, and the different elements of the program work together
coherently. See JOSEPH MURPHY, 501 IDEAS FOR YOUR COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS PROGRAM 93-6 (2008); Murphy & Boehme, supra note 243, at 4-5.
245
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nature of its activities, the industries in which it operates,
and, of course, the applicable legal environment. 247
Materials that discuss and encourage compliance
measures, such as brochures and similar materials,
PowerPoint slides, and policy books, are common and
widely distributed. 248 Nevertheless, the training and
education provided to managers and employees do not
seem fully effective, and the rate and seriousness of
antitrust violations, including repeat offenses, persist
largely unabated. 249 That is not to say that PowerPoint
training is useless—presentations that convey eyeopening information and provide accurate and
predictable information for business operators can make
a key contribution to inducing compliance. 250 It is

See generally INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, The ICC Antitrust
Compliance
Toolkit
(2013),
https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2013/04/ICC-AntitrustCompliance-ToolkitENGLISH.pdfhttps://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2013/04/ICC
-Antitrust-Compliance-Toolkit-ENGLISH.pdf (suggesting practical tips for
building compliance programs).
248 See generally Banks, supra note 27 (indicating that there is ample
information available about antitrust in the form of policies, handbooks,
slides, etc.).
249 See generally id. (stating that antitrust violations continue
regardless of access to information).
250 See generally Murphy & Boehme, supra note 243 (highlighting
examples of times that employees have admitted to accidental
noncompliance after receiving proper training on what constitutes
compliance).
247
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doubtful that a compliance program relying solely on
classroom-style teaching sessions will make the
difference between compliance and non-compliance.
Conceivably, there may even be a risk that a determined
price-fixer might be emboldened by enhanced
knowledge about how the enforcement system works
rather than deterred. 251 While it may be useful for a
company manager to know specifics about the law, such
as maximum corporate penalties for misconduct,
focusing too much on such details may dilute the more
fundamental objective which is to trigger a cultural
change within the corporate environment. 252 From this
point of view, a policy of promoting effective
compliance programs requires a solid understanding of
the relevant corporate culture and the relevant social and
political norms. A holistic approach that takes account
of these factors will help to create a strong and
sustainable compliance culture at all levels of the
organization and thus contribute to the success of the
competition law that applies in a given jurisdiction. It
will induce company personnel to develop effective
internal mechanisms consonant with the external
regulatory pressure of the law and tailored specifically to

251 However, a determined price-fixer may of course attempt to engage
in misconduct irrespective of whether he has a sophisticated understanding
of the applicable legal prohibitions.
252 See generally John Galgay, Corporate Plans and Policies for
Voluntary Antitrust Compliance, 19 BUS. LAW 637 (1964) (suggesting that
businessmen do not need to understand antitrust law as intimately as an
antitrust lawyer but having a basic understand will help businessmen see
that compliance programs are good for businesses).
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the firm in light of its managerial, corporate, and social
culture. As Galgay observed more than fifty years ago,
compliance efforts should aim to achieve a level of
sympathetic understanding of the antitrust prohibitions
which:
[I]s in the constant and conscious forefront of the
minds of businessmen, so that [this sympathetic
understanding] may operate as an ever-present and
conscious guide in future actions. … [Bringing that
sympathetic understanding] to the forefront of their minds
is, it seems to me, the most important task of lawyers
concerned with compliance programs emphasis added). 253

When a business actor achieves what John Galgay
calls a sympathetic understanding of the law, a process
of internalization of norms has taken place; the will to
comply with the law has become the actor’s own norm
and has become part of his or her identity. 254 Because
the agenda of promoting sympathetic understanding,
internalized norms, and the will to comply is effected by
the interplay between external discipline of the law and
internal corporate dynamics, the “black box” of the firm
needs to be uncovered, not only to develop better

253 Id. at 641.
254 See George

Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, Identity and the Economics
of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 12 (2005) (“Psychologists say that
people can internalize norms; the norms become their own and guide their
behavior.”).
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understandings of the structure and internal governance
of the organization, but more importantly to understand
the invisible, and often psychological rules, governing
the communication channels between managers and
employees. 255
Regardless of the position competition authorities
take on the debate about whether compliance programs
should be taken into account when those authorities
calculate fines, or whether such programs should be
made a mandatory condition for the grant of leniency, 256
there is no doubt that several authorities are trying to
provide both financial and reputational incentives for
firms to actively invest in compliance programs. 257 The
key issue in making a compliance program effective is

255 See D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
785, 789 (2013) (indicating that after nearly three decades, the myth of the
“black box” of the firm is still perpetuated in antitrust scholarship). See
generally Ronald Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM.
ECON. REV. 713, 714 (1992) (using the “black box” metaphor, which was
originally used in the very different context of electronic circuit theory and
cybernetics and later used in numerous other fields, and now appears to have
been transposed to the subject of corporate behavior).
256 See generally Fisse, supra note 72 (arguing that corporations should
not be given any leniency in anti-cartel sanctions against them unless the
corporation has a compliance program in place).
257 See Florence Thépot, Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to
Effective Antitrust Enforcement?, COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 191 (Johannes Paha ed.,
2016).
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how an authority can best collaborate with business
operators to ensure that they internalize the potential
costs of infringements caused, at least in part, by poor
corporate governance, and to encourage a change in
corporate culture so that a compliance culture prevails at
all levels of the businesses concerned. 258 On the
corporate side, cultural elements need to be taken into
account; CEOs, managers, sales staff, and other
employees at various positions within the corporate
hierarchy must cooperate and communicate effectively
and third parties may also be relevantas Nielsen and
Parker have pointed out, the influence of customers,
shareholders, business partners, and employees can have
a significant and positive impact on corporate
compliance. 259
2. Paternalistic Leadership at CEO and Senior Manager
Level

Although it has been acknowledged that
competition compliance programs are important, the
design and implementation of such programs are often
weak, and while lectures, workshops, and compliance

See Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, at 47-9 (2015).
See Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent
Do Third Parties Influence Business Compliance? 35 J. L. & SOC. 309, 340
(2008).
258
259

78

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 15.1

manuals can be helpful, they are unlikely to suffice. 260 It
is doubtful that a thin or merely pro forma approach to
compliance will make a difference in securing better
compliance, at least absent more comprehensive efforts.
In the context of East Asia, this point is reflected in a
study by Van Uytsel that led him to conclude that the
compliance manuals of the large Japanese firms
surveyed, along with the compliance training sessions
organized by those firms, are of low value. 261
Therefore, a compliance policy is more likely to be
successful when it is embedded within the corporate
culture. 262 The policy has to be implemented through the
continuous dedication and support of managers and
employees. 263 As Stephany Watson advises, there must

260 See, e.g., Joseph Murphy, Promoting Compliance with Competition
Law: Do Compliance and Ethics Programs Have a Role to Play? ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2012) at 251-52 (“In the past companies
might have satisfied themselves that they were doing ‘all they could
possibly do’ by sending out codes and manuals, having employees sign
certifications, and having lawyers give lectures on the statutes but this is no
longer considered an effective approach.”).
261 See Steven Van Uytsel, Leniency in Japan—An Empirical Survey
of
its
Use
(2015),
at
18-20,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692445.
262 See Rachel Taylor, A Cultural Revolution: The Demise of
Corporate Culture Through the Whistleblower Bounty Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. LAW 69, 78 (2013).
263 See Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the
Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 7 (2004).
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be specific individuals “from top to bottom” that are
responsible for building a strong compliance culture.264
Companies must promote This compliance culture
through building trust, commitment, and cooperation
between employees. 265 The most responsible public
companies have devoted significant efforts to promoting
trust, ethics, and good compliance practices, which are
positively correlated with business success, and
companies with a strong and sustainable culture of
voluntary compliance at all levels can derive substantial
value from their compliance efforts. 266
The paternalistic leadership style in East Asian
companies suggests that senior managers and employees
are expected to fulfill mutual obligations. 267
Subordinates are willing to perform the tasks that their
senior managers assign to them, and father-like
managers, who provide support and protection for the
employees’ professional (and sometimes even personal)

See id. at 38.
See id. at 31-2.
266 See Taylor, supra note 262, at 81-5 (2013).
267 Paternalistic leadership is also observed in countries such as India,
Turkey and Mexico, among others. See Zeynep Aycan et al., Impact of
Culture on Human Resource Management Practices: A 10-Country
Comparison, 49 APPLIED PSYCH.: AN INT’L REV. 192 (2000); Ekin
Pellegrini & Terri Scandura, Paternalistic Leadership: A Review and
Agenda for Future Research, 34 J. MGMT. 566 (2008).
264
265
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lives, repay subordinates’ obedient behavior. 268
However, since leaders and subordinates are engaged in
a long-term reciprocal relationship of a very broad scope
that extends to personal and affective-emotional
dimensions, 269 employees in East Asian firms may be
less willing to “blow the whistle” by reporting the
misconduct of managers or other employees, or by
coming clean about their own transgressions. 270 Indeed,
the fact that CEOs and senior managers in East Asia
often play a paternal role might have the effect of
intensifying the “loss of face” that may come with selfreporting misconduct and correcting past errors. 271

268 See Pellegrini & Scandura, supra note 267, at 567; Ying Chen et
al., Supervisor-Subordinate Guanxi: Developing a Three-Dimensional
Model and Scale, 5 MGMT & ORG. REV. 375, 378 (2009) (suggesting that
there are three key components of the supervisor-subordinate guanxi
relationship: affective attachment, personal life inclusion, and deference to
the supervisor).
269 See Xiao-Ping Chen et al., Affective Trust in Chinese Leaders:
Linking Paternalistic Leadership to Employee Performance, 40 J. MGMT.
796, 802 (2014).
270 See Irwin, supra note 234, at 16. See also Bor-Shiuan Cheng et al.,
A Triad Model of Paternalistic Leadership: Evidence from Business
Organizations in Mainland China, 20 INDIGENOUS PSYCH. RES. CHINESE
SOC’Y. 209 (2003); Tsung-Yu Wu et al., Expressing or Suppressing Anger:
Subordinate’s Anger Responses to Supervisors’ Authoritarian Behaviors in
a Taiwan Enterprise, 18 INDIGENOUS PSYCH. RES. CHINESE SOC’Y. 3 (2002).
271 See P. CHRISTOPHER EARLEY, FACE, HARMONY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR ACROSS
CULTURES 137 (Oxford University, 1st ed. 1997) (explaining the nexus
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Many empirical studies show that a serious
commitment to compliance must be observed at the
highest echelons of the organization. 272 For example, on
the basis of their examination of forty-three (43) antitrust
cases covering a span of twenty (22) years, Sally
Simpson and Christopher Koper argue that, compared
with other factors, antitrust violations are most likely to
be correlated with managerial variables that depend on
the characteristics of a company’s top leadership. 273

between the importance of face in East Asian societies and the collectivism
prevailing in those societies); See also Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese
Concepts of Face, 46 AM. ANTHROP. 45, 61 (1944) (linking social standing
and the fear of isolation and noting that “[i]n extreme cases the realization
that one’s conduct has been damned by group standards drives an individual
to suicide.”); See Qiumin Dong & Yu-Feng L. Lee, The Chinese Concept of
Face: A Perspective for Business Communicators, 20 J. BUS. & SOC. 204,
205 (2007) (noting in Chinese and other group-oriented Asian cultures, a
“loss of face” is closely associated with a loss of status within a given social
network. Conversely, a gain of face indicates enhanced respect or attention
from others in the network.).
272 See, e.g., Sally Simpson & Christopher Koper, The Changing of the
Guard: Top Management Team Characteristics, Organizational Strain, and
Antitrust Offending, 1960-1986, 13 J. QUANT. CRIM. 373 (1997).
273 See id. at 394 (finding that “chief executive officers from certain
subunits, most notably finance and administration, increase company
involvement in antitrust offending. To the extent that the philosophies of
finance and administration are used to assess problems and promote
solutions within the organization, internal strain [from poor or declining
corporate performance, or from the fear thereof] may develop among
managers, subunits, and divisions, as resources, power, and upward
mobility are all affected by bottom-line performance criteria. These results
lend credence to… speculation of almost two decades ago that an
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Another study focusing on forty (40) international cartels
prosecuted in Europe and the U.S. from 1998 to 2008
shows that most episodes of collusion were organized by
senior managers such as general managers, heads of
sales, company presidents and vice-presidents,
managing directors and CEOs. 274 The resulting
argument that the top corporate leadership must set the
tone for compliance at all levels of the firm applies a
fortiori in Confucian societies where hierarchical
leadership and patriarchal relationships are prominent
and where loyalty and obedience are expected from
subordinates. 275 In this context, the external discipline of
the law may seem quite remote compared to the
immediacy of the norms that apply within the confines
of the organization. Therefore, the efficacy of the law
may depend to a great degree on whether the corporate
leadership’s commitment to compliance is genuine and
sufficiently visible within the firm, and whether the

overemphasis on organizational goals [in this case efficiency] may come
with an unanticipated price.”).
274 See Andreas Stephan, Hear No Evil, See No Evil: Why Antitrust
Compliance Programmes May Be Ineffective at Preventing Cartels, ESRC
CENTRE
COMP.
POLICY
&
NORWICH
L.
SCH.
8-9,
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8256108/CCP+Worki
ng+Paper+09-09.pdf/9d0cd693-8796-408c-b6eb-90b414d1ecf3
(last
visited August 8, 2018).
275 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 254 (noting the emphasis on the
internalization of norms, which shapes an actor’s identity).
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requirements of relevant legal norms are translated
within the firm into social norms that employees then
internalize and make their own. 276 Of course, tonesetting is important at lower levels of the organization as
well, 277 but the “tone at the top” is the indispensable
driving force for the whole company’s investment in
compliance. 278 In scenarios where senior executives
have disproportionate importance in corporate
governance, 279 it is essential to ensure that their
commitment to antitrust compliance is beyond
question. 280 In this context, where a business’ authority
is highly centralized, an executive must act as a role

276 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 254 (noting the emphasis on the
internalization of norms, which shapes an actor’s identity).
277 See Hon. Patti Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks at
the 12th Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute (Oct. 7, 2013)
(http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizationalguidelines/special-reports/saris-remarks-annual-compliance-and-ethicsinstitute.pdf).
278 See Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More
Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 169, 187 (2015).
279 See Len Gainsford & Angus Young, Compliance Heroes,
Leadership, and Ethnical Values: In Search of a Chinese Benchmark (Aug.
31, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1464602
(last visited August 8, 2018).
280 See Sokol & Abrantes-Metz, supra note 19, at 593 (“The CEO must
project a sincere desire to comply. This will set the tone for the entire
organization in terms of its antitrust compliance. The CEO must be fully
committed to the antitrust compliance program and be consistent in such
commitment.”).
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model for the company. As Confucius once said in plain
terms: if the leader acts properly, the common people
will obey him without being ordered to; if the leader does
not act properly, the common people will not obey him
even after repeated injunctions. 281
3. The Compliance Officer

A company’s chief compliance and ethics officer is
a core element of an effective compliance program.282
Ideally, this person should play a direct and central role
in ensuring the success of the program. 283 They should
be independent in performing their duties, highly trusted

281 K.C.P. Low & Sik-Liong Ang, Confucian Leadership and
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The Way Forward, 2 ASIAN J. BUS.
RES. 85, 88 (2012) (quoting Analects of Confucius, XIII:6).
282 See generally Deborah DeMott, The Crucial but (Potentially)
Precarious Position of the Chief Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 56, 59 (2013) (discussing compliance and the role of
compliance officers with reference to financial and banking scandals); John
Krenitsky, Defining the Chief Compliance Officer Role, 6 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 303, 311 (2017) (noting the potential complexity facing compliance
officers due to the numerous regulatory fields that may apply in the
corporate context and pointing out that responsibilities for compliance may
well have to be divided among different specialists and coordinated by the
chief compliance officer.).
283 See Banks & Murphy, supra note 3, at 381 (calling for “[a]n
empowered, senior officer-level chief ethics and compliance officer with
sufficient autonomy, empowerment, and resources. If there is not a strong
compliance and ethics officer at the top, the program may be nothing more
than a corporate decoration.”).
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and visible to all employees, and well-informed about all
aspects of the company’s compliance program. 284 They
should not wear multiple or conflicting hats; playing the
part of teammate in one meeting and referee in the
next. 285 The notion of establishing a dedicated
compliance officer within the management structure and
of situating that officer in an independent compliance
department is relatively new. 286
Traditionally,
compliance matters were typically handled by the
company’s general counsel or by a subordinate. in some
organizations, this trend is still the norm. 287 In a survey
by the Association of Corporate Counsel in 2010, nearly
half of the respondents confirmed that either the general
counsel was the chief compliance officer, or that
compliance was part of the general counsel’s duties. 288
Similarly, in a 2013 Corpedia survey in which 630
compliance professionals participated, only thirty-six
percent (36%) answered that they reported to the general
counsel. 289 Of course, separating the compliance officer

See Lachnit, supra note 5, at 43.
See John McNeece IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General
Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677
(2012).
286 See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 71,
75 (2014).
287 See id. at 74.
288 See id. at 99.
289 Id.
284
285
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from the legal department is only realistic if it is possible
to allocate substantial budget and decision-making
power to separate compliance personnel. 290 The
arguments for establishing a separate and autonomous
compliance department to encourage intramural
competition leading to better compliance practices 291
seem to be less compelling when the management
structure of a company is highly centralized, and where
bottom-up and cross-department communication is
weak. 292
Another issue is whether East Asian firms are willing
to hire in-house lawyers as independent compliance
officers. 293 In a survey of ninety-seven (97) listed
companies in Shenyang, Shenzhen and Shanghai, 51.5
percent of the respondents replied that the company had
hired in-house lawyers, but the number of lawyers hired
was either one or two. 294 Thirty-four percent (34%)
answered that they had not hired any in-house lawyers,
and 14.4 percent did not provide an answer. 295 The most

See id. at 82.
See id. at 83.
292 See id.
293 See generally Kota Fukui, On Prevailing Corporate Legal
Compliance: Comparative Empirical Study on Need for Lawyers in
Corporations in China and Japan, 63 OSAKA U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).
294 See id. at 4.
295 See id.
290
291
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frequent answer for not hiring an in-house lawyer was
either that there was, “no work that needs a lawyer’s
help,” or that the company did not have a sufficiently
organized structure to use a lawyer. 296 When asked to
describe the ideal type of in-house lawyer, the most
common response valued the “general counsel type”
(29.9%). 297 This implies that in-house lawyers are
expected to hold an authoritarian position similar to the
executive directors and to work closely with the
executive body on legal issues. 298 When asked about the
capacities and personal attributes most desired for inhouse lawyers, respondents identified a “sense of
commitment” (62.9%) and “loyalty to the corporation”
(56.7%). 299 Since the task of implementing a corporate
compliance program is often discharged by a company’s
Chief Legal Officer and carried out by in-house
corporate lawyers, 300 these answers might indicate that
the role and function of the compliance officer in
Chinese firms are similar to those of a senior executive
as opposed to a fully independent professional. In

See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 9.
298 See id.
299 See id.
300 See Robert Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate
Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L. J. 203, 203 (2016). See
also Riley & Sokol, supra note 13, at 6.
296
297
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smaller companies, it may be more realistic to let the
CEO take responsibility for compliance.
4. Effective Communication and Education

Many empirical studies on unethical and illegal
conduct show that the reason some managers violate the
law is not because they are oblivious to legal
prohibitions—the
prohibitions
are
deliberately
301
disregarded.
In a study surveying 2,321 business
firms to assess the deterrent effect of the criminalization
of cartel conduct by the Australian Parliament in July
2009 (given effect by the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010), Parker and Nielsen showed that the very
serious applicable sanctions and other consequences—
including criminal penalties, corporate fines, and private
actions for damages—had little impact on compliance
management. 302 Furthermore, there was no correlation
between the fear of being punished and any change in
compliance performance. 303 Recent empirical studies
show that informing industry of legal sanctions does not

301

at 386.

302
303

See Parker & Nielson, Deterrence and the Impact, supra note 16,
See id. at 393.
See id. at 406.
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deter until the prohibited conduct is perceived to be
sufficiently associated with moral opprobrium. 304
The findings of the above studies call for further
reflection on the issue of how managers and employees
could be trained to comply with the requirements of
competition law and policy. The notion that the risk of
significant sanctions and possible detection alone suffice
to stimulate compliance is increasingly archaic. 305

304 See N. Craig Smith et al., Why Managers Fail to Do the Right
Thing: An Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 633 (2007). See also Tom Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment
to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, 50 CALIF. MGMT REV. 31,
34 (2008) (finding over 80 percent of the sample of compliance choices
made by employees were incentivized by internal judgements on right and
wrong, and by perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the manager’s
authority. Only, whereas only 20 percent of the compliance choices were
motivated by concerns about being punished.).
305 See, e.g., Maurice Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics &
Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 769 (2014). Stucke distinguishes
between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” approaches to compliance. An intrinsic
approach involves the development of an ethical culture within a company
for its own sake (i.e., for moral reasons), and not to tradeoff between the
costs and benefits of lawful versus unlawful conduct. See id. at 825. In
reaction to this dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic compliance, Ma
and Marquis have cautioned that “it may not be prudent to establish a strict
hierarchy between an ethics-based approach and a more calculative
approach focused on tradeoffs. Maintaining conditions that favor both selfrewarding and materially rewarding benefits in parallel may be desirable
insofar as these benefits may have mutually reinforcing effects.” Ma &
Marquis, supra note 79, at 40 n. 368. However, the latter authors endorsed
Stucke’s suggestion that “too much emphasis has been placed on material,
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Consequently, it is necessary to develop a strategy that
takes account of the social construction of compliance
and the need to understand and then shape, where
necessary, the logic of appropriateness that prevails
within the walls of an organization.
In the context of East Asia, part of the strategy should
build on the cultural-historical infrastructure which
underlies commercial life, as outlined in this article.
Confucian doctrines could thus be applied as part of the
effort to educate corporate leaders 306 and employees and
build moral engagement on the subject of cartel
activities. Confucian ethics emphasize the importance of
moral education, and it is usually the responsibility of
parents and leaders to educate children and subordinates
with moral codes; the ideal result is to produce a “moral
gentleman” (junzi). 307 The Confucian system of

cost-benefit reasoning, and not enough on the idea that doing the ‘right
thing’ and implementing ethical leadership are self-justifying pursuits.”
306 To some extent, this idea may also apply to top leadership and
company managers. However, top management bears additional
responsibility in that they must actively take the steps necessary to ensure
an adequate compliance culture throughout the organization. This entails,
among other things, a more proactive approach to learning, including selfeducation, as compared to the typical Confucian learning style. See Baiyin
Yang et al., Confucian View of Learning and Implications for Developing
Human Resources, 8 ADVANCES DEVELOPING HUMAN RES. 346, 349 (2006).
307 See Chau-kiu Cheung & Andrew Chi-fai Chan, Philosophical
Foundations of Eminent Hong Kong Chinese CEOs’ Leadership, 60 J. BUS.
ETHICS 47, 49 (2005).

2019

CORPORATE CULTURE & COMPETITION COMPLIANCE

91

teaching and education attaches high value to morality
and social responsibility and less attention is given to
discovering the truth. 308 Learners usually prefer an
accurate, systematic, and slow approach when receiving
instructions, and teachers usually employ tools such as
lists, rote memorization, and repetition. 309 Since
employees are accustomed to an instructor-centered
approach to education, and since they rarely express
dissent or personal opinions in front of a group, 310
providing a list of “do’s” and “don’ts” through formal
training courses might be manageable and easy to
implement.
While employees in countries with
Confucian traditions may prefer a more systematic, slow
approach compared to the interactive, spontaneous, and
quick approach often seen in western countries, 311 it is
crucial to ensure that employees understand why and
how the compliance program is implemented—to show
why cartel behavior is unambiguously unethical.
Although it is simple and expedient for multinational
corporations with subsidiaries spread across continents
to give employees slide presentations outlining the finer

See Yang et al., supra note 306, at 351.
See id. at 349.
310 See id. at 352.
311 See id. at 351-52.
308
309
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points of competition law, 312 it is more important to
instill the idea that conduct such as fixing prices or
colluding on tenders is tainted with moral stigma and
leads to a loss of face for the individuals concerned and
for the entire organization. 313 Teaching employees that
cartel conduct is unambiguously unethical and raising
the specter of social stigma are more likely to be more
effective than emphasizing the threat of severe
administrative and/or criminal sanctions. The Confucian
value of moral “righteousness” (yi) is taught in East
Asian countries, and the sense of right or wrong is
cultivated through the transmission and absorption of
moral rules. 314 It follows that explicitly moral messages
should be a natural part of a company’s efforts to shape
the norms and behavior of employees. 315 Moreover,

312 See Michele Lee, Building an Effective Antitrust Compliance
Program: International and Cultural Challenges, ANTITRUST COMP. BULL.
16, 18 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, March 2006).
313 See Tsung-Yu Wu et al., supra note 270.
314 See, e.g., Mei-Ju Chou et al., Confucianism and Character
Education: A Chinese View, 9 J. SOC. SCI. 59, 64 (2013) (“Character
education has provided the means by which the values and teachings of
Confucius has been transmitted to the people.”).
315 Educators in the field of business ethics are also calling for a
synthesis of the Confucian virtues and the more modern business ethos
associated with globalized business. See Peter Woods & David Lamond,
Junzi and Rushang: A Confucian Approach to Business Ethics, A
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CONTEXT, 3 (2011) https://www.anzam.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf-manager/623_ANZAM2011-434.PDF (“The ideal
new Confucian business person in the modern day would be a virtuous
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tapping into Confucian-oriented moral education to
implement compliance concepts is also consistent with
the argument that the command-and-control style of
compliance education should be de-emphasized in favor
of value-based compliance training. 316 In this vein, and
as empiricists suggest creating identity between the
values of the company and the values of its employees,
and making ethical rules and boundaries credible, are
elements more apt to secure compliance than relying on
either command-and-control mechanisms or carrots and
sticks. 317 Indeed, it may be that aspiring to compliance
is not aiming high enough. In the East Asian context, a
more ambitious and fruitful objective would be to
cultivate virtue at all levels of a company, and to instill
the idea that lawfully competitive conduct is a necessary

business person who possess qualities such as benevolence (ren),
[righteousness] (yi), propriety (li), wisdom (zhi), and trustworthiness (xin),
meantime, the business person is able to make use the advanced
management techniques from the Western world.”).
316 See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating
Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 961, 975 (2012).
317 See id. at 375-77; See also Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing
Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CALIF.
MGMT. REV. 131, 135-36 (1999).
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part of virtuous conduct that enables the company to
flourish as a good corporate citizen. 318
5. Cultural Changes to Shape Business Incentives

In the many countries where competition law is
not a long-standing tradition, business executives and
employees may not be fully aware of the illegality of
cartel activities (all the more so in the case of SMEs),
and they may be either unaware of leniency programs or
may have only weak incentives to use such programs to
report violations to the competent authorities. 319

318 See Woods & Lamond, supra note 315, at 8, (as noted above, others
have likewise called for a more explicit virtue-based approach to good
business ethics.).
319 Indonesia is an example of a developing country where competition
law has been in place for two decades, yet there is still limited cognizance
of the law among the business community. However, the strong outreach
efforts of the Indonesian competition authority have raised the level of
business awareness. See Deswin Nur, Understanding the Competition Law
and Policy of Indonesia, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 9 (2015). Nur refers to
two studies conducted by the Indonesian competition authority in 2009 and
2014 to measure awareness on the part of businesses in metropolitan Jakarta
with regard to the existence of the applicable competition law. Id. In 2009,
only 26 percent of surveyed businesses were aware of the law even after
about nine years of enforcement. Id. However, following intensive outreach
efforts, the figure increased to 60 percent by 2014. Id. Experience from the
UK indicates that low business awareness of competition law can be a
significant issue even in a developed country where the law has been
applied actively by the national and European competition authorities. As
summarized by O’Regan, research published in 2014 showed that only 30%
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Inducing competition compliance would not only require
the development of an internal mechanism to facilitate
the function of the compliance programs, but also to
change business incentives to promote compliance ethics
and competition values. 320 The path-dependent legacy
of Confucianism in East Asian countries implies that the
government and relevant executive organs and enforcers
wield abundant influence and are well-placed to promote
competition culture and compliance and to actively
shape appropriate incentives for business operators. But
in order to ensure that such incentives are established, a
fundamental (though not sufficient) condition for
success is political will. 321 It is already well known that
enforcing laws against cartels in countries with weak
political support for competition policy is extremely
challenging. 322 Indeed, to achieve legal and cultural

of UK businesses knew that market sharing was illegal, and only 55% of
UK businesses knew that price fixing was illegal. See Matthew O’Regan,
Criminal Enforcement of Competition Law: The UK Experience 1, 2 (2017),
http://www.stjohnschambers.co.uk/dashboard/wp-content/uploads/MOAdvanced-EU-Competition-Law.pdf.
320 See generally, Riley & Sokol, supra note 13.
321 “The introduction and implementation of a competition law is
fraught with problems. Political will is necessary every step of the way.”
SUSAN JOEKES & PHIL EVANS, COMPETITION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS 61 (2008).
322 See, e.g., Rijit Sengupta & Cornelius Dube, Competition Policy
Enforcement: Experiences from Developing Countries and Implications for
Investment, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT VII, 10
(2008), http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40303419.pdf (“In
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change in societies where the government historically
encouraged cartel behavior, it was necessary for
institutional elites to repudiate misguided policies which
caused a cultural and behavioral tipping point. 323 Where
this process of legal and cultural change does not take
hold and where efforts fail to reach the tipping point,
there will be a lack of “moral seriousness” with regard to
cartels; without moral seriousness, it will be difficult if
not impossible to create and reinforce an anti-cartel
social norm among the public, and to attach serious
social stigma to cartel behavior. 324 People are only
likely to comply with a behavioral law if they believe in
the “legitimate authority” of the law and of the agency
that enforces it. 325 In this light, it is crucial to consider

many countries, governments are seen not to have any plans or commitment
to the promotion of competition in the market. Such apathy could be a result
of a pre-determined approach to evolving the market, or merely a lack of
awareness of the economic benefits of competition.”).
323 A dramatic example of a country where a cartel culture has
successfully transformed into a competition culture that embraces the
functioning of markets and the application of competition law is Germany.
See generally David Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German
Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the New Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L.
25 (1994) (tracing a broad arc of twentieth century history in which, among
other things, Germany’s cartel economy in the 1930s and 1940s was
repudiated notably in 1958 with the adoption of Germany’s modern
competition law and cartel prohibition).
324 See Cf. Parker, supra note 16.
325 See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Tom Tyler &
John Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views about
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how regulatory schemes and enforcement tools could be
adapted to change a firm’s behavior. For example,
behavior may be modified when granting conditional
fine reductions or conditionally immunizing a firm from
criminal liability when it can show a good faith effort to
comply notwithstanding the infraction for which it was
investigated. 326
IV. CONCLUSION

This article has expressed the view that efforts to
secure competition law compliance among commercial
operators can be tailored in a way that takes account of
cultural characteristics. The cultural background forms
part of the conditions in which the development of a
robust and credible compliance system occurs.
Therefore, it makes sense to approach compliance issues
in a manner sensitive to that cultural background. In the
context of East Asian enterprises, this implies a need to
take account of the legacy of Confucian ethics, which has
had a profound influence on the psychology and
behavior of commercial organizations in the region. The
importance of that legacy suggests that compliance will

Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account when
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 735 (2000).
326 For comprehensive discussion, see Stucke, In Search of, supra note
305. We note that the research conducted thus far on compliance has not
unambiguously established, in empirical terms, that the offer of specific
rewards by enforcement authorities guarantees that the business community
as a whole will make a deeper commitment to compliance. Nevertheless,
we consider that visible signs of commitment to “compliance policy” on the
part of enforcers can send important and valuable signals to enterprises and
to the wider public.

98

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 15.1

not be achieved within East Asian firms solely based on
the external legal environment; an environment in which
deterrence-oriented factors such as sanctions and the
threat of detection play a central role. More attention
should be given to the internal moral and social
environment, and to the logic of appropriateness within
a given firm. A compliance culture can thus be
constructed on the basis of elements such as moral
commitment, Eastern-style education, the cultivation of
virtue and a convergence between the interests of the
enterprise and those of its employees.

